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Abstract 
The Nordic synchronous power system has come to a situation in which the operational 
security is challenged due to the reformation of the power system, which especially con-
cerns the electricity production palette. In addition, European regulation has set demand-
ing requirements with tight deadlines for the European TSOs regarding system operation 
and balancing. In order to tackle the challenges and to comply with the regulatory obliga-
tions, the Nordic TSOs have concluded a cooperation agreement, which defines the roles 
and responsibilities of the TSOs concerning the future Nordic balancing cooperation. The 
upcoming modifications, which relate to market solutions and power balance manage-
ment, engender questions on how the changes affect the Finnish power system balancing 
and how the system should be balanced in the future. 
This thesis includes a literature review and an empirical research. The literature re-
view creates an overview of the current Nordic power system balancing. In addition, it 
introduces the key elements of the future Nordic balancing cooperation. The empirical 
part analyses quantitatively and qualitatively the influences of the upcoming changes on 
the power system balancing and whether the changes promote proactive or reactive bal-
ancing design. 
According to the findings, Fingrid should exercise reactive power system balancing 
in the future. The upcoming changes will increase the responsibility of the market partic-
ipants to control their own balance in a more accurate manner closer to real time. In ad-
dition, various forecasts and plans related to the forthcoming balancing periods are likely 
to become less reliable in the future, which shakes the foundations of proactive balancing 
performed by Fingrid. Thus, proactive balancing actions of the TSO could result in flawed 
outcomes and inefficient balancing performance due to, for instance, counter activations. 
Furthermore, some examples within EU area have shown that the introduction of reactive 
balancing design is likely to reduce the volume of system imbalances and the amount of 
balancing product activations. Despite the benefits, reactive balancing requires further 
research from the congestion management point of view as power grid conditions may set 
limitations on the balancing design.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Pohjoismainen synkronijärjestelmä on tullut tilanteeseen, jossa järjestelmän käyttövar-
muus on haasteiden edessä sähköjärjestelmässä tapahtuvien muutosten, etenkin tuotan-
torakenteen uudistuksen, seurauksena. Lisäksi eurooppalainen lainsäädäntö on asettanut 
vaativia tavoitteita kireillä käyttönottoaikatauluilla eurooppalaisille kantaverkkoyhtiöille. 
Selviytyäkseen haasteista ja noudattaakseen eurooppalaista lainsäädäntöä pohjoismaiset 
kantaverkkoyhtiöt ovat solmineet yhteistyösopimuksen tulevasta pohjoismaisesta tase-
hallinnasta. Sopimus määrittelee pohjoismaisten kantaverkkoyhtiöiden tehtävät ja vel-
voitteet sähköjärjestelmän tasapainottamiseen ja yhteistoimintaan liittyen. Tulevat muu-
tokset, jotka koskevat markkinaratkaisuja ja tasehallintaa, synnyttävät kysymyksiä siitä, 
miten muutokset vaikuttavat Suomen sähköjärjestelmän tasehallintaan ja miten tasapai-
nottaminen tulisi tulevaisuudessa hoitaa. 
Tämä diplomityö koostuu kirjallisuuskatsauksesta ja empiirisestä tutkimuksesta. 
Kirjallisuuskatsaus luo kokonaiskuvan siitä, miten sähköjärjestelmän tasapainottaminen 
nykyisin hoidetaan Pohjoismaissa. Lisäksi se tuo esille keskeisimmät muutokset, joita 
pohjoismaisen tasehallinnan ja yhteistoiminnan tulevaisuuteen liittyy. Empiirinen osuus 
tutkii kvantitatiivisesti ja kvalitatiivisesti tulevien muutosten vaikutusta sähköjärjestel-
män tasapainottamiseen ja tukevatko muutokset proaktiivista vai reaktiivista säätötapaa. 
Työn tulosten mukaan Fingridin tulisi toteuttaa reaktiivista sähköjärjestelmän ta-
sapainotusta tulevaisuudessa. Tulevat muutokset kasvattavat markkinaosapuolten vas-
tuuta kontrolloida omaa tasetta tarkemmin lähempänä käyttöhetkeä. Lisäksi ennusteet ja 
suunnitelmat, jotka liittyvät tulevien tasapainotusjaksojen ennakointiin, ovat todennä-
köisesti epäluotettavampia tulevaisuudessa, mikä heikentää Fingridin toteuttaman 
proaktiivisen säätötavan lähtökohtia. Sen vuoksi kantaverkkoyhtiön toteuttama enna-
koiva säätötapa voi johtaa virheellisiin lopputuloksiin ja heikentää tasapainotuksen suo-
rituskykyä esimerkiksi vastasäädöistä johtuen. Lisäksi esimerkit EU:n alueella ovat osoit-
taneet, että reaktiivisen säätötavan käyttöönotto todennäköisesti vähentää sekä sähköjär-
jestelmän tasepoikkeamia että säätöä varten akti-voidun energian määrää. Hyödyistä 
huolimatta reaktiivinen säätötapa tarvitsee vielä lisätutkimusta verkon hallinnan näkö-
kulmasta, sillä sähköverkon tilan huomioiminen voi asettaa rajoitteita säätötavalle.  
 
 
Avainsanat Pohjoismainen sähköjärjestelmä, sähköjärjestelmän tasapainottaminen, 
proaktiivinen säätö, reaktiivinen säätö 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and purpose of the thesis 
The Nordic power system is synchronously interconnected, which means that the power 
system area shares a common frequency and therefore, a change of power at one point 
has an influence on the frequency and power flow in the entire system (Statnett et al. 
2016). The Nordic synchronous system is divided into four subsystems, which are divided 
further into 11 bidding areas as presented in figure 1 below. Each subsystem has an ap-
pointed transmission system operator (TSO): Energinet.dk for the Danish subsystem, Fin-
grid for the Finnish subsystem, Statnett for the Norwegian subsystem and Svenska Kraft-
nät for the Swedish subsystem. (ENTSO-E 2006)  
 
 
Figure 1: The Nordic synchronous power system consists of 11 bidding areas that are FI, SE 1-4, 
NO 1-5 and DK2 (Nord Pool 2019a). 
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Transmission system operators are responsible for the reliable power system operations 
and frequency control by maintaining power balance between electricity production and 
consumption (Scherer 2016). Since there are four different TSOs operating in the Nordic 
synchronous power system area, a cooperation between the parties has been a necessity 
in order to fulfill the responsibilities reasonably. Accordingly, the Nordic TSOs have a 
long collaboration history concerning various tasks related to the power system opera-
tions, planning and market solutions. (Statnett et al. 2016) Now the Nordic synchronous 
system has come to a situation in which the operational security of the whole system is 
challenged. The underlying reason is the reformation of the electricity production palette 
in order to mitigate climate change and the increment in the capacity of high-voltage 
direct current (HVDC) interconnectors. Along with these aspects, the European regula-
tion including the guideline of electricity transmission system operation (SOGL) and the 
guideline for electricity balancing (EBGL) has set requirements and obligations with de-
manding deadlines for the TSOs. (Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018) In order to 
tackle the challenges and to comply with the European regulation, the Nordic transmis-
sion system operators have concluded a cooperation agreement, which defines the roles 
and responsibilities of the TSOs related to the future Nordic balancing cooperation. In 
addition, the TSOs have created an implementation roadmap for the development of Nor-
dic power system balancing. (Svenska Kraftnät et al. 2019)  
 
The upcoming changes related to the Nordic balancing will increase the operational re-
sponsibility of the Nordic TSOs. Each TSO will be more responsible for maintaining 
power balance in their own control area. In addition, the utilization of market based solu-
tions and price signals originating from them shall be increased. (Affärverket Svenska 
kraftnät et al. 2018) There are no former studies or papers discussing how the Finnish 
power system balancing should be managed and what kind of balancing strategy and phi-
losophy should Fingrid follow in the future. Therefore, this thesis will answer to the fol-
lowing questions: 
 
 
 What are the implications of the upcoming changes for the balancing design of 
the Finnish power system? 
 Should Fingrid promote proactive or reactive balancing design? 
 What are the reasons for the design choice and what are the aspects that require 
further research? 
 
 
This thesis puts together several changes that relates to the development of the Nordic 
power system balancing. It focuses on the market and balancing perspectives without 
giving much weight to the network conditions that limit the operations, such as power 
grid congestions. Congestion management would have been rather large and separate per-
spective in this thesis, but it definitely requires further consideration in some other paper. 
The conclusions and recommendations that are given in this thesis can work as a basis for 
further discussion related to the balancing philosophy of the Finnish power system. 
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1.2 Content and structure of the thesis 
The thesis starts by introducing the background and purpose and the content and structure 
of the thesis in the first chapter. In the same chapter, the regulatory framework is intro-
duced, since the European energy policy, reflected in the regulation, is one of the key 
driving forces changing the balancing operations of the power systems within EU area.  
 
The second chapter clarifies how the current balancing of the Nordic power system is 
executed. The chapter introduces basic principles of imbalances, how the imbalances are 
taken care of and what kind of balancing structure and products are required in the Nor-
dics. In addition, imbalance settlement is discussed more closely as it is a major contrib-
utor influencing on the behavior of the balance responsible parties (BRP). 
 
The third chapter deals with the future of the Nordic power system balancing in order to 
clarify what are the changes that shape the responsibilities and processes of the Nordic 
TSOs. The chapter introduces the key elements of the Nordic balancing development, 
fundamentals of area control error (ACE) based balancing, imbalance prognosis model 
and the European balancing market platforms that affect the development process via 
defining balancing product specifications.  
 
The fourth chapter analyses how the upcoming changes affect the balancing design and 
philosophy of Fingrid. There are altogether four perspectives and design principles con-
sidered: market solutions, usability of production plans, availability of frequency restora-
tion reserves and economic optimization. 
 
The fifth chapter summarizes the conclusions of this thesis in order to answer the research 
questions. In addition, the chapter includes recommendations that are based on the find-
ings of this thesis. Furthermore, a few topics related to the future work and further re-
search are highlighted. 
 
Chapters one, two and three are based on a literature review, which aims to provide a 
sufficient amount of information about the current and future state of the Nordic power 
system balancing to the reader. The fourth chapter is based on new and original experi-
mental work: Various data analyses are carried out and some of the findings and deduc-
tions are supported by former research papers. The fifth chapter puts together the findings 
and conclusion that arise from the literature review and the experimental work. The ref-
erences used in this thesis are mainly TSO publications, different regulation documents 
and peer-reviewed journal articles. Especially the latter two can be considered as papers 
of a good quality. The data analyses are based on data that is retrieved from Fingrid’s 
open data website, Fingrid’s internal IT-systems and Nord Pool’s market data website. 
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1.3 Regulatory framework 
This thesis is interested in the regulatory framework, since it sets requirements and im-
plementation deadlines for the European transmission system operators regarding system 
operations and balancing. In this thesis there are several parts in which the regulatory 
context is brought out and therefore, it is important to consider the ultimate purpose of 
the European regulation, particularly system operation guideline (SOGL) and electricity 
balancing guideline (EBGL). 
 
The system operation guideline (SOGL) relates to the European commission regulation 
and it entered into force in mid-2017. One of its main objective is to harmonize the rules 
concerning system operation carried out by the transmission system operators (TSO), dis-
tribution system operators (DSO) and significant grid users (SGU). The harmonization 
aims to result in a clear legal framework for system operation and ease the trading of 
electricity within the European Union and across the member states. Along with these 
aspects, the SOGL tries to ensure the availability and exchange of relevant data between 
the stakeholders that are involved in the system operation. Overall, the guideline improves 
the efficient use of the network and increases competition, which benefits the consumers 
and ensures system security while the integration of renewable energy sources continues 
to grow. (EUR-lex 2019a) 
 
In addition to the system operation guideline, there exists an electricity balancing guide-
line (EBGL), which also facilitates the development of fully functioning and intercon-
nected internal energy market within EU area. The EBGL entered into force at the end of 
2017 and it sets various rules and requirements concerning balancing. The guideline de-
fines the common principles for the procurement, activation and settlement of frequency 
containment, frequency restoration and replacement reserves. Efficient balancing rules 
aim to create appropriate incentives for the market participants so that they will help the 
system with the imbalance and scarcity mitigation. Such a well-functioning market should 
promote more efficient use of energy and additionally, encourage the producers to invest 
in new production facilities, especially generation units that produce electricity from re-
newable energy sources. (EUR-lex 2019b) 
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2 Current balancing of the Nordic power system 
2.1 Framework for balancing 
Electric power systems are complex networks consisting of electrical appliances that are 
owned and operated by several different parties in order to enable production, transmis-
sion, distribution and consumption of electricity. Power systems are prone to imbalances 
due to the mismatch between electricity production and consumption, which is one of the 
major challenges related to the power system stability and control. Equation 1 below ex-
emplifies how the imbalances arise: If the sum of consumption and losses is greater than 
the production, there exists an electricity deficit in the power system. If the sum is less 
than the production, there exists an electricity surplus.  
 
 
                            𝐼𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠                        (1) 
 
 
The Nordic power system includes various producers and consumers, which generate and 
utilize varying amounts of electricity according to their interests. Thus, there is a need for 
processes that enable electricity exchanges and price formation for these exchanges so 
that different stakeholders with different necessities can trade electricity with each other. 
Electricity trading was remarkably influenced by the European electricity market liberal-
ization, which was launched in the middle of the 1990s. It unbundled the electricity gen-
eration and distribution ownerships and businesses and created competitive markets for 
electricity sales in order to allow consumers to buy electricity from any supplier they want 
regardless the geographical location. (Partanen et al. 2015) 
  
In the wholesale markets electricity trading takes place between large-scale market par-
ticipants that are electricity consumers, electricity producers, traders and retailers, which 
procure electricity in order to fulfill the electricity demand of their retail market customers 
(Partanen et al. 2015). Market participants that are eventually responsible for balancing 
load and generation portfolios are referred to as balance responsible parties (BRPs) and 
all the physical connection points are linked to them (Hirth & Ziegenhagen 2015).  
 
The common liberalized wholesale market for electricity in the Northern European area 
includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Latvia and Sweden. The whole-
sale marketplace for financial products is Nasdaq OMX Commodities and the power ex-
change is currently Nord Pool in which majority of the physical power is traded. 
(Boomsma et al. 2014; Partanen et al. 2015). However, European regulation that has re-
cently come into force allows multiple power exchanges to operate in one bidding zone 
(Emissions-EUTS.com 2019a). Thus, there may exist other power exchanges in addition 
to Nord Pool in the Nordics in the future. Nord Pool provides day-ahead and intraday 
markets to the market participants: Day-ahead market is the main marketplace for trading 
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power and there contracts are made between buyers and sellers regarding the electricity 
that will be delivered on an hourly basis the following day. Deadline for submitting bids 
is 12:00 CET and the power contracts are physically delivered beginning from 00:00 CET 
covering all the hours of the next day. (Nord Pool 2019b) Intraday market supplements 
the day-ahead market by enabling trading closer to real time. It is a continuous market 
meaning that trading takes place round the clock every day after the day-ahead market 
closure. The intraday market closes one hour before the period of operation and it allows 
the market participants to trade electricity after the day-ahead market closure. It should 
be separately noted, that the intraday gate closure time is exceptionally 30 minutes in 
Finland and between the border of Finland and Estonia. (Nord Pool 2019c)  
 
Actions and bids of the market participants are driven by planning and forecasting. Before 
sellers submit bids, they need to assess and decide how much electrical energy they are 
capable of delivering and at what price. On the other hand, before buyers submit bids, 
they must consider the volume that is required to meet their future electricity demand. 
(Nord Pool 2019b) Thus, the day-ahead and intraday markets can be seen as balancing 
tools to ensure power system balance by setting predicted supply and demand in equilib-
rium. However, transactional balance may not result in flawless physical balance due to 
forecast errors and unforeseen events causing loss of production or consumption, such as 
power plant trips.  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned stochastic occurrences, power system imbalances fol-
low from the behavior of the market participants, since the actual production and con-
sumption patterns may differ from the forecasted and scheduled positions during the op-
erating hour (Copenhagen Economics 2017). For instance, a large electricity consumer 
can procure 10 MWh of electricity from the power exchange meaning that it should con-
sume energy at an average power rate of 10 MW for an hour. However, the consumer can 
deviate from the average power rate. In the beginning of the period, it can consume energy 
at lower rate and in the end at higher rate. On the other hand, the producer that should 
supply the demand can deviate from the scheduled position due to, for example, power 
facility ramping requirements at hour shifts (Hirst & Kirby 1996). The positive and neg-
ative deviations can net out over the one-hour period of examination, which means that 
real time power system imbalances can take place, although the electricity trades can 
match up perfectly with the physical electricity deliveries over the hour period (Copen-
hagen Economics 2017). Figure 2 below represents the netting out of production devia-
tions in the morning of January 16, 2019. The black line shows the actual production in 
Finland between 07:00 – 08:00. The red line is the average production, which can be 
considered as the scheduled and forecasted production for that hour. The gray area is 
negative deviation and the blue area is positive deviation. Since they are equally sized, 
energy will net out and thus, the scheduled position is perfectly accurate over the hour. 
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Figure 2: Netting out of deviations between actual production and scheduled production between 
07:00 – 08:00 in the morning of January 16, 2019. 
 
Because of the physical and organizational structure, the Nordic power system is prone 
to imbalances. If the production and consumption patterns were accurately predictable 
and all the possible changes were deterministic, there would not appear imbalances during 
the real time system operation (Scherer 2016). It is noteworthy that the power system 
frequency is dependent on the real time imbalances: It increases due to electricity surplus 
and decreases due to electricity deficit. For stable system operation, the frequency should 
be kept nearly constant by restraining imbalances. Additionally, the frequency is common 
throughout the system: A change in production or consumption at one point affects the 
frequency of the whole system. Major frequency drops can cause high magnetizing cur-
rents in the grid-connected appliances, such as generators and transformers, and may re-
sult in equipment damages and, ultimately, blackouts. (Kundur 1994) Thus, the frequency 
and imbalances of the power system must be controlled in real time in order to prevent 
severe system failures that could even lead up to societal inefficiencies. 
 
The real time control of the power system frequency needs ancillary services (Scherer 
2016). In a paper that deals with electric-power ancillary services, Hirst & Kirby (1996) 
bring out a definition of ancillary services as “those services necessary to support the 
transmission of electric power from seller to purchaser given the obligations of control 
areas and transmitting utilities within those control areas to maintain reliable operations 
of the interconnected transmission system.” The frequency control and ancillary services 
should be taken care of by transmission system operators (TSO) as they are responsible 
for the reliable power system operations (Scherer 2016). In practice, the respective TSOs 
activate balancing power, if the sum of BRP imbalances differ from zero (Hirth & Zieg-
enhagen 2015). In order to do so, there is a need for associated generation or controllable 
load resources that, however, cannot be owned by the TSOs due to the market liberaliza-
tion. Thus, the acquisition of those resources usually follow market-based mechanisms. 
(Scherer 2016) 
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As there are four different TSOs operating in the Nordic synchronous power system, a 
system operation agreement (SOA) is needed to control the operations between the TSOs 
and to guide the cooperation in order to ensure fluent control of the common synchronous 
power system (ENTSO-E 2006). The Nordic SOA clarifies the responsibilities of the 
TSOs. After the intraday market closure and during the operational hour, balancing of the 
Nordic power system is the responsibility of the TSOs. The goal of the TSO input is to 
secure operational stability and to maintain the frequency in such a way that the frequency 
quality requirements are met. In order to do so, the TSOs are responsible for making 
sufficient amount of balancing resources available considering the agreed minimum vol-
umes. (ENTSO-E 2016) In addition, the parties have agreed that Statnett and Svenska 
Kraftnät, called as the balance operators hereafter, will lead the balancing, since approx-
imately 75 % of the annual consumption of the Nordic synchronous system takes place 
in Norway and Sweden. During normal conditions, Fingrid and Energinet.dk will perform 
balancing operations only after contacting Svenska Kraftnät. (ENTSO-E 2017). 
 
Along with the responsibilities, the Nordic system operation agreement defines bounda-
ries for the frequency quality that are in compliance with the requirements set by the 
system operation guideline (SOGL). The synchronous system frequency is allowed to 
range between 49.90 and 50.10 Hz during normal operation and the balancing processes 
should aim to maintain 50 Hz frequency. The SOGL obliges the TSOs to keep the minutes 
outside of the normal frequency band below 15 000 minutes per year and the Nordic TSOs 
have agreed that the limit is 10 000 minutes per year, which fulfils the requirement set by 
the European regulation. The TSOs might want to deviate purposefully from the 50 Hz, 
for instance, during the morning hours when the consumption is ramping upwards. In 
such a situation, keeping the frequency higher than 50 Hz creates a better margin for 
balancing, because presumably the demand is going to increase further. (ENTSO-E 2016; 
EUR-lex. 2019a) Figure 3 below shows the development of the minutes outside the nor-
mal frequency band starting from 2002. It can be observed that the limit of 10 000 minutes 
per year has been violated several times during the recent years, which indicates that the 
system operation is challenged and it needs to be developed.   
 
 
Figure 3: Minutes outside the normal frequency band in the Nordic synchronous system (Copenha-
gen Economics 2017). 
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2.2 Balancing products 
The physical properties of the power systems define the requirements and preconditions 
for the frequency control structure and ancillary services. Figure 4 below illustrates some 
qualitative aspects that need to be considered when designing a basic control structure of 
a power system. Although the diagram is not all-encompassing, it can be interpreted that 
the nature and characteristics of power imbalances along with the network conditions 
determine what kind of control services and balancing products are needed.  
 
 
Figure 4: A high-level decision diagram concerning power system control structure (Scherer 2016). 
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Depending on the nature of the power system, multiple types of balancing power products 
are required in order to supply balancing power for the system appropriately. The balanc-
ing products have different physical properties, such as response time, activation fre-
quency and way of activation (Hirth & Ziegenhagen 2015). The balancing product re-
serves are power plants or load resources that adjust their electricity production or con-
sumption up or down according to the power system need. In the Nordic power system 
there are two types of reserves that are utilized in a different manner: Frequency contain-
ment reserves (FCR) are used for continuous frequency control and to stabilize the fre-
quency whereas Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) are used to return the frequency 
back to its normal range and to release activated FCR. Replacement reserves (RR), on the 
other hand, are not used in the Nordic power system, but RR could be utilized to handle 
long lasting imbalances and to release activated FRR back into use. (Fingrid 2019a) FCR 
and FRR can be divided further into more specific products. Frequency containment re-
serves include products for normal operation (FCR-N) and for case of disturbances (FCR-
D). FCR-N is utilized to balance the system frequency within the normal frequency range 
of 49.90 – 50.10 Hz and FCR-D is utilized for balancing in situations where the frequency 
falls below 49.90 Hz. They both activate automatically and are locally controlled accord-
ing to the system frequency. Frequency restoration reserves include products that can be 
activated automatically (aFRR) or manually (mFRR). (ENTSO-E 2016) As shown in fig-
ure 5 below, it has been common to categorize the products into three control types ac-
cording to their purpose of use: Primary control, secondary control and tertiary control 
(UCTE 2004). In the Nordics, both frequency containment reserve types are involved in 
the primary control, automatic FRR is secondary control and tertiary control include man-
ual FRR.  
 
 
Figure 5: System frequency control types (UCTE 2004). 
 
Fingrid procures all of these reserves by maintaining several marketplaces, where the 
balance service providers (BSP) submit bids regarding their reserve resources (Fingrid 
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2019b). The bids are divided into up balancing and down balancing bids. Up balancing is 
needed when the electricity supply is less than the demand, which can be managed by 
increasing production or decreasing consumption. On the other hand, down balancing is 
needed when the electricity supply is greater than the demand and then the solution is to 
decrease production or increase consumption.  
2.2.1 Automatic frequency restoration reserves 
aFRR is a balancing product that is remotely controlled according to the Nordic synchro-
nous system frequency by a centralized controller. The frequency is metered continuously 
and its deviations determine the magnitude of the aFRR power change that is required to 
restore the frequency back to 50 Hz and to release activated FCR back into use. The Nor-
dic TSOs have agreed on that the necessary power change calculations are performed in 
the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of Statnett. After calculat-
ing the need of aFRR power change, Statnett sends activation signals to the relevant 
TSOs, which relay the signals further to the BSPs in their own control area. In Finland 
Fingrid transmits the activation signal every ten seconds. (Fingrid 2016a) 
 
The sign of the signal defines the direction of the power change. Minus sign means that 
the reserve resource must perform down balancing and plus sign means the reserve re-
source must perform up balancing. The resource participating to the automatic frequency 
restoration reserves must be capable of reaching its full capacity within 120 seconds and 
the activation must start no later than 30 seconds after receiving the control signal. (Fin-
grid 2016a) Figure 6 below illustrates the activation time limits for the aFRR. The red 
line depicts the minimum activation speed of the resource. 
 
 
Figure 6: Time limits for aFRR resource activation in Finland. 
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Fingrid ensures automatic frequency restoration reserve availability by maintaining aFRR 
capacity markets and by ordering it from Svenska Kraftnät. aFRR capacity is procured 
only for certain morning and evening hours that are published well in advance. BSPs 
submit bids separately for up balancing and down balancing capacities and the size of an 
individual bid must be 5 MW at least. After the market closes, Fingrid sets the bids in 
ascending order of price and then the needed amount of up balancing and down balancing 
bids are contracted for balancing purposes. The relevant BSPs will receive capacity pay-
ment and energy compensation, which is determined based on the activated mFRR bids, 
since there is no energy activation market for the aFRR to determine the aFRR energy 
compensation. (Fingrid 2016b) 
2.2.2 Manual frequency restoration reserves 
Manual frequency restoration reserve is a balancing product that is utilized under normal 
and disturbance conditions in order to balance the frequency deviations and to handle 
possible power grid congestions. It is currently the main product for balancing and it re-
leases both the activated FCR and aFRR back into use and simultaneously restores the 
frequency back to 50 Hz. mFRR is manual and slower product compared to aFRR in the 
frequency restoration process. The Nordic power system relies heavily on mFRR re-
sources, since the aFRR volumes are limited. (ENTSO-E 2016) 
 
Fingrid ensures the availability of mFRR via two marketplaces: capacity market and en-
ergy market. In the mFRR energy market, the BSPs submit bids concerning their adjust-
able resources that are still available after day-ahead and intraday trading. The bids in-
clude information, such as the capacity in megawatts and the energy price in euros per 
megawatt hour. Finnish BSPs submit the bids to a data system maintained by Fingrid and 
the bids must be submitted 45 minutes before the operating hour at the latest. After that, 
the Nordic TSOs send the bids on to a common Nordic balancing market list in which all 
the bids are set in order of price and necessary amount of bids are accepted taking into 
account cost optimization and congestion management. If a Finnish bid is chosen, Fingrid 
orders and activates the bid by either calling or transmitting an electronic message to the 
BSP. The minimum capacity of an electronically orderable bid is 5 MW and otherwise 
10 MW. The reserve resources must be fully activated within 15 minutes after the order. 
(Fingrid 2019d) 
 
The activated energy bids determine the balancing energy prices. In order to determine 
up balancing price the bids are set in ascending order of price and the most expensive 
activated bid determines the energy price for up balancing. According to this price, the 
BSP with accepted bid gets its energy payment from Fingrid. In order to determine down 
balancing price the bids are set in descending order of price and the cheapest activated 
bid determines the energy price for down balancing. According to this price, Fingrid 
charges the BSP with accepted bid for the energy. (Fingrid 2019c)  
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Along with the mFRR balancing energy market, Fingrid maintains mFRR capacity mar-
ket. The balance service providers participating in the capacity market are obliged to sub-
mit bids to the above-mentioned mFRR energy market, if their capacity bids become ac-
cepted. The bids that are submitted under an obligation to the energy market supplement 
the bids that are submitted voluntarily. The mFRR capacity market bids include infor-
mation about the capacity, which can vary between 5 and 50 MW, and the desired capac-
ity payment. They are both fixed for a week period. The BSPs with accepted capacity 
bids will receive appropriate capacity payment. (Fingrid 2019e) The mFRR capacity mar-
ket is maintained to ensure the availability of mFRR energy market bids in order to handle 
unforeseen power system faults and disturbances (Fingrid 2019c).  
2.3 Balancing process 
Power system balancing is a long process as a whole. Already years before real time 
operations market participants start to make financial product contracts. When moving 
closer to real time market participants enter the day-ahead and intraday markets to trade 
power with each other in order to achieve equilibrium between production and consump-
tion. Simultaneously, the Nordic TSOs perform various tasks in order to secure efficient 
real time balancing process, for example, by ensuring balancing product availability via 
maintaining different marketplaces. TSOs need to execute the balancing process in such 
a way that the frequency quality requirements set are fulfilled within the synchronous 
system. The planning of the balancing process is dependent on the available information 
and Statnett together with Svenska Kraftnät are responsible for carrying out the actions 
of balancing under normal operating conditions. Figure 7 below illustrates parts of the 
information flow and some activities that are needed for the real time balancing. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Illustration of the close to real time balancing process of the Nordic TSOs. 
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The information regarding the market actions starts to flow to the TSOs after the day-
ahead market closure. By taking advantage of the available data, TSOs form an hour-by-
hour overview for the next day, which gives an initial indication, for instance, if there will 
take place congestions in the power grid during the hours of the following day. Each TSO 
in the Nordic synchronous system makes their own overview assessment, but addition-
ally, the balance operators make a coordinated version concerning the whole Nordic syn-
chronous system. The assessment is based on various data including preliminary con-
sumption forecasts produced by each TSO, preliminary production plans from BRPs, day-
ahead exchange plans from Nord Pool taking into account AC- and DC-connections and 
preliminary balancing energy market bids. After the completion of the assessment, Fin-
grid can ask balance service providers to submit additional mFRR balancing energy bids, 
if there exist a threat of mFRR volume inadequacy. However, the request is not legally 
binding meaning that the balance service providers can freely decide whether to partici-
pate to the balancing energy marketplace or not even if they have available capacity. 
(ENTSO-E 2016) 
 
When moving closer to real time, the next significant period from the balancing process 
point of view begins after the intraday market closure. All the information concerning the 
market actions and behavior of the market participants gets more accurate when ap-
proaching the operating hour. The balancing process planning goes further as the con-
sumption prognoses, production plans and exchange plans are updated. In addition, the 
exact mFRR availability is known 45 minutes before the operating hour as the balancing 
energy market closes. All the above-mentioned data is gathered together in Nordic oper-
ational information system (NOIS), which is a common platform for the Nordic TSOs to 
provide relevant data. On the grounds of the compiled planning information and present 
operational situation, Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät evaluate the need for balancing, in-
cluding balancing volume and direction, in the Nordic synchronous system during the 
following hour. The optimal utilization of balancing energy bids is agreed between the  
TSOs and the bids are used in order of price during normal conditions. The relevant TSOs 
will order the accepted bids by calling or by sending electronic message to the BSPs that 
eventually operate the resources. (ENTSO-E 2016) 
 
During the operating hour, the balancing situation of the Nordic power system must be 
supervised non-stop by the balance operators. The need for balance readjustment must be 
continuously analyzed in a similar way to the evaluation process described above, but 
with shorter-term changes in mind. Therefore, the availability of planning data and real 
time measurements is important in order to utilize them as a basis for the re-evaluation. 
Occasionally the operators need to rely on rapid decision making concerning the power 
system balancing as there exists always a risk of unpredictable events, for instance power 
plant trips. The resulting solutions in such occasions are based on the available real time 
data and planned information. In addition, there may arise occasions in which the areas 
need to be balanced separately due to the limited availability of transmission capacity. 
The separation is jointly decided by the TSOs in real time. For example, Finland is one 
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bidding area and Fingrid can balance it alone, if that is needed in order to solve the trans-
mission system constraints. Congestions have always priority over the frequency in the 
Nordic synchronous system. (ENTSO-E 2016) 
 
Due to the nature and composition of the Nordic power system, there may arise situations 
where actions that deviate from the normal balancing process are required, such as special 
regulation and hour shift planning. Special regulation is ordered from the balancing en-
ergy market by TSOs and instead of balance management, it is used for congestion man-
agement or to cover some unforeseen incidents taking place in the power system. The 
bids activated for the special regulation purpose are not necessarily used in order of price 
and they are not taken into account when determining imbalance power price, which is 
discussed more closely in the next chapter. In addition to the special regulation, the bal-
ance operators need to evaluate if there is a need to put forward or backward parts of 
planned production before the operating hour. Large production changes and HVDC ex-
change around the hour shift may result in frequency deviations that cannot be entirely 
tackled by following normal balancing processes. Thus, the balance operators may need 
to create a plan how to cope with the large changes by agreeing with the BRPs about the 
production rescheduling. (ENTSO-E 2016) 
2.4 Imbalance settlement 
Transmission system operators are responsible for ensuring real time balance between 
production and consumption, which is managed by activating different market-based bal-
ancing products. The need for such balancing come from the imbalances that are caused 
intentionally or unintentionally by different balance responsible parties (BRP) represent-
ing one or more market participants along with themselves. The BRPs are under an obli-
gation of planning their production and consumption portfolios into balance on hourly 
basis and in addition, they need to submit hourly production plans to the TSOs. After the 
operating hour, all the realized and measured energy deliveries are compared to the initial 
energy plans and the BRPs are penalized with an imbalance price, if deviations exist. This 
is called as the imbalance settlement process, which gives the BRPs an incentive to be-
have in a certain manner. Without financial consequences there would not exist any BRP 
interests toward balancing. (van der Veen & Hakvoort 2009) 
 
The imbalance settlement process and services are brought to the market participants in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden by eSett, which is jointly owned by the TSOs of the coun-
tries in question. The role of eSett is to act as the Nordic imbalance settlement responsible, 
which performs the imbalance settlement process including various operations and tasks, 
such as the data collection, validation and management in addition to the settlement cal-
culations and charging the BRPs in accordance with the caused deviations over the im-
balance settlement periods. The ultimate settlement responsibility belongs to the TSOs 
that are open suppliers for the BRPs and carry out actions in order to rebalance the system. 
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After the imbalances of the BRPs are settled and the balancing costs are allocated amongst 
the relevant BRPs, the imbalance settlement shifts downwards along the open supplier 
chain to the level that connects the balance responsible parties with electricity retailers. 
As the BRPs may take care of the balancing obligation on behalf of other market partici-
pants, they are most likely willing to get compensation for the imbalances that are caused 
by their clients. Thus, the BRPs may allocate the balancing costs further to the relevant 
electricity retailers depending on the agreement they have made. The whole calculation 
process is based on energy metering data that is received from distribution system opera-
tors (DSOs), which operate the energy measurement processes within metering grid areas 
(MGA). (eSett 2019) Figure 8 below illustrates the linkages between different parties 
related to the imbalance settlement. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Interactions between different stakeholders regarding the imbalance settlement process in 
the Nordics (Fingrid 2019f). 
 
The settlement model that is utilized to sort out the imbalances of the BRPs was intro-
duced in 2009 and is based on two different calculations: The imbalance volumes of pro-
duction and consumption are calculated separately as presented in figure 9 below. The 
production imbalance volume is calculated by subtracting the planned production from 
the actual measured production. In addition, production imbalance adjustment is required 
if a production resource object included in the portfolio of the BRP has participated in the 
balancing energy market. The consumption imbalance is calculated as the deviation be-
tween consumption, planned production, trades, consumption imbalance adjustment and 
metering grid area (MGA) imbalance, which includes the grid losses taking place in the 
distribution network. (eSett 2019)  
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Figure 9: Equations to calculate production and consumption imbalance volumes (eSett 2019). 
 
The two imbalances are priced differently: Dual pricing is applied to the production im-
balance and single pricing is applied to the consumption imbalance. The first means that 
positive and negative production imbalances have different prices and the second means 
that the same price is applied to both positive and negative consumption imbalances. As 
the pricing models for the production and consumption imbalances differ, the financial 
incentives encourage the BRPs to manage the two imbalances differently. The dual price 
model for the production imbalance works as the follows: If a BRP has a negative pro-
duction imbalance over an hour in which the main balancing direction is up, the BRP is 
obliged to purchase energy from eSett with an up balancing price in order to fulfil the 
energy deficit that took place over the operating hour. If the BRP has a positive production 
imbalance over an hour in which the main balancing direction is up, the BRP is obliged 
to sell the excess energy with day-ahead price in order to trade away the surplus that 
occurred over the operating hour. During an hour in which the main balancing direction 
is down, a BRP with a negative production imbalance is obliged to purchase missing 
energy with day-ahead price and if the production imbalance is positive, the BRP is 
obliged to sell the produced excess energy with down balancing price. (eSett 2019) 
 
This mechanism creates an incentive for the BRPs not to cause production imbalances 
against the main balancing direction, as the up balancing price is typically higher and the 
down balancing price is typically lower than the day-ahead market price. Thus, during an 
up balancing hour, a negative production imbalance will result in additional costs, as the 
energy would have been cheaper in the day-ahead market. On the other hand, a positive 
production imbalance will not provide any additional profit for the BRP, because the price 
is the same as in the day-ahead market. During a down balancing hour, a negative pro-
duction imbalance will not bring any additional profit, since the price is the same as in 
the day-ahead market. On the other hand, a positive production imbalance will provide 
lower profit for the energy as the BRP needs to sell it for the down balancing price, which 
yields less income than the day-ahead market price. 
 
The single price model for the consumption imbalance incentivize the BRPs to behave in 
such a manner that the consumption imbalances they bring on support the power system. 
This can be explained by the pricing as the same price is applied to both positive and 
negative consumption imbalances. Thus, if the imbalances of the BRPs are to the main 
balancing direction, the BRPs can make more profit by creating intentional imbalances 
than trading on the day-ahead market. (eSett 2019) Table 1 below elaborates how the 
different balancing prices are applied. It is important to understand, that if the BRPs are 
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willing to cause intentional imbalances within the period of operation, i.e. exercise self-
balancing, it means that the BRPs must have proper knowledge about the balancing situ-
ation of the power system in real time in order to cause imbalances in the right balancing 
direction.  
 
Table 1: Pricing of consumption and production imbalances. 
 
 
The whole imbalance settlement process including the allocation of imbalance costs to 
the relevant BRPs works as a basis for power system balancing. The incentive mechanism 
that results from the imbalance settlement model directs the balance responsible parties 
to behave according to a certain manner. The behavior of the BRPs and the resulting 
imbalances form the system imbalance, which affects the power system frequency and 
which needs to be taken care of by the responsible transmission system operators. The 
TSOs perform actions and activate market-based balancing resource bids in order to mit-
igate the power system imbalance. The activated balancing energy bids determine the 
balancing energy prices, which work as a foundation for the imbalance pricing, which is 
clarified in the table above. For the present, activated mFRR energy bids determine the 
balancing energy prices, although automatic frequency reserves and frequency contain-
ments reserves also contribute to the system balancing (ENTSO-E 2016). Imbalance set-
tlement and pricing affect how the BRPs are compensated or charged depending on their 
imbalances and the balancing state of the power system. This whole chain of conse-
quences can be referred to as the feedback loop, which is demonstrated in figure 10 below. 
It shows how the different events and actions related to balancing are linked together and 
how the feedback loop should ultimately refine the market behavior of the BRPs. How-
ever, if the financial consequences for the BRPs are not sufficient, the loop lacks control 
effect (van der Veen & Hakvoort 2009). 
 
Hours in which the main 
balancing direction is 
up
Hours in which the main 
balancing direction is 
down
Hours with no balancing 
direction
Dual price model for production imbalances
Negative consumption 
imbalance
Up balancing price Down balancing price Day-ahead market price
Positive production 
imbalance
Up balancing price Down balancing price Day-ahead market price
Single price model for production imbalances
Negative production 
imbalance
Up balancing price Day-ahead market price Day-ahead market price
Positive production 
imbalance
Day-ahead market price Down balancing price Day-ahead market price
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Figure 10: The feedback loop, which refines the BRP behaviour (van der Veen et al. 2012). 
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3 Future of the Nordic power system balancing 
In 2018 the Nordic TSOs concluded a cooperation agreement, which defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the TSOs concerning future Nordic balancing. The agreement obligates 
the TSO to follow a mutual roadmap regarding implementation and development of the 
new balancing model and common balancing markets. It also outlines the tasks related to 
the new balancing structure. (Statnett 2019) In addition, system operation guideline 
(SOGL) and electricity balancing guideline (EBGL), which are both European regulation, 
have set new requirements for the TSOs that need to be implemented. This chapter will 
discuss key elements of the Nordic balancing development more closely and introduce 
area control error based balancing model, which is one of the cornerstones of the future 
Nordic power system balancing. The European balancing market platforms MARI and 
PICASSO are considered as well, since they will contribute to the development and inte-
gration of balancing on European level.  
3.1 Key elements of the Nordic balancing development 
There exist plenty of driving forces behind the development of the Nordic power system 
balancing. One of the main goals of the Nordic balancing cooperation is to secure and 
enhance operational security of the system in the short and long term. This is ensured by 
means of improving the efficiency of system operation and clarifying the responsibilities 
and freedoms related to the tasks and functions of the Nordic transmission system opera-
tors: Each TSO shall be more in charge of the imbalances that arise out of own control 
area. Another significant objective is to support the security of supply and socio-eco-
nomic welfare now and in the future. This is guaranteed by the utilization of market based 
solutions that create well-functioning and transparent markets. Third driving force to be 
considered is the fact that the Nordic power system balancing should meet the require-
ments of European regulation and legislative instruments. All of these aspects together 
will enable the transition towards clean and intermittent power system. (Affärverket 
Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018) This chapter will introduce the key elements that form the 
core of the Nordic power system balancing development and that help the Nordic TSOs 
to reach the discussed goals. 
3.1.1 LFC structure and ACE 
Currently the responsibility for maintaining the frequency and time deviation within set 
limits in the Nordic synchronous system is an operational duty allocated to Svenska Kraft-
nät and Stattnet, which is agreed in the Nordic system operation agreement (SOA). This 
will be changed due to the new cooperation agreement and the implementation of area 
control error (ACE), which will increase the operational responsibility of each Nordic 
TSO for maintaining balance in own control area. In the future, the Nordic synchronous 
system is comprised of one load frequency control (LFC) block, which consists of bidding 
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zones that are formed considering the major bottlenecks in the power grid. Each bidding 
zone will be an LFC area. (Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018) The obligation for 
the determination of the LFC block and areas comes from the SOGL article 141(2), which 
states that all the TSOs of a synchronous area shall together develop a proposal concern-
ing the LFC structure (EUR-lex 2019a). Figure 11 below shows how the Nordic system 
will be divided into LFC areas. It can be observed that Finland corresponds to one LFC 
area. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: LFC structure in Nordic synchronous area (ENTSO-E 2018a). 
 
The cooperation agreement and ACE based balancing model will entail changes to the 
tasks and responsibilities of the Nordic TSOs. ACE is a calculated measure reflecting the 
instantaneous power imbalance in an LFC area. In the future, each TSO is responsible for 
calculating ACE and ACE open loop per LFC area, which should be handled no later than 
10 seconds after real time. For each LFC area, the relevant TSO should also generate an 
LFC controller, which calculates automatic frequency restoration reserve demand for the 
LFC area based on ACE calculations and already activated aFRR. In other words, the 
LFC controller directs the utilization and activation of automatic frequency restoration 
reserve. Along with these tasks, each TSO should calculate LFC area imbalance prognosis 
for the upcoming period of operation. Additionally, each TSO should be capable of cal-
culating and making request for manual frequency restoration reserve activations and the 
imbalance prognosis should work partly as a basis for the assessment of mFRR demand. 
(Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018)  
 
These tasks and responsibilities imply that under normal operational conditions, the au-
tomatic frequency restoration reserve is utilized for reactive balancing and the manual 
frequency restoration reserve is for proactive balancing, which means that it is utilized to 
take care of the forecasted imbalances and to release expected aFRR activation. However, 
the establishment of LFC controller and imbalance prognosis model for each LFC area is 
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a duty that is allocated to each relevant TSO, which means that the TSOs have some 
freedom related to the design of those functions. Thus, each TSO can influence on how 
the balancing products are utilized inside own LFC areas, which highlights the need for 
discussion concerning balancing philosophy. 
3.1.2 Advances in frequency restoration reserve markets 
The new cooperation agreement brings also tasks and responsibilities for the Nordic TSOs 
related to the development of manual and automatic frequency restoration reserve mar-
kets. Each TSO is responsible for establishing a method to gather aFRR and mFRR en-
ergy activation bids from balance service providers. The TSOs should also be capable of 
recognizing and marking bids that cannot be activated because of internal bottlenecks 
inside the LFC areas.  After these procedures, the TSOs should have an ability to make 
the bids available for the Nordic activation optimization functions (AOF), which are de-
veloped and operated by the common service providers that are Svenska Kraftnät and 
Statnett in the Nordics. Both manual and automatic FRR types will have an own specific 
AOF, but they will work according to the same basic logic: Both of the functions optimize 
the activation of reserve resources over all of the Nordic LFC areas taking into account 
demand, netting possibilities, available transfer capacity and bid prices. In addition, the 
AOF for mFRR should respect the design of MARI, which is the new and upcoming 
European manual frequency restoration reserve platform, and the AOF for aFRR should 
respect the design of PICASSO, which is the new and upcoming European automatic 
frequency restoration reserve platform. Along with sustaining proper marketplaces, each 
individual TSO needs to have a way of sending electronic activation signals to the BSPs 
operating the aFRR and mFRR resources that are chosen to be activated. In addition, 
marginal pricing should be implemented for aFRR and both reserve types should be 
priced on 15 minutes basis. (Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018) Currently, there is 
balancing energy market only for the manual frequency restoration reserve, but the above-
mentioned matters signify that there will also be an energy activation market for auto-
matic frequency restoration reserve in the future. In addition, 15 minutes pricing will be 
applied to both reserve types instead of 60 minutes pricing, which is currently imple-
mented for the mFRR energy market.  
 
Along with the development of manual and automatic frequency restoration reserve en-
ergy markets, the capacity markets for both reserve types will undergo major changes. In 
the cooperation agreement it is included that the common service providers Svenska 
Kraftnät and Statnett are responsible for the development and operation of a Nordic ca-
pacity market for mFRR and aFRR. The system they will establish should be capable of 
collecting bids from all the balance service providers in the Nordics and monitoring ca-
pacity reservation algorithm. Each individual TSO must calculate the volume of capacity 
needed to be procured in compliance with the set dimensioning principles and ensure that 
the infrastructure of communications towards the BSPs is sufficient. All the Nordic TSOs 
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are allowed to join the common capacity market for aFRR and mFRR, but the participa-
tion is not required. (Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018) Currently, the mFRR and 
aFRR capacities are procured mainly from national markets with a few exceptions, but 
the changes presented above will enable shifting the procurement from national to Nordic 
level. 
3.1.3 15 minutes imbalance settlement period 
An imbalance settlement period (ISP) is a time unit for which the imbalances of the BRPs 
are calculated. It directs the behavior of the BRPs, since they will be penalized for their 
imbalances that they cause over the ISPs. The article 53 of the electricity balancing guide-
line (EBGL), which concerns imbalance settlement period, states that all the TSOs shall 
apply 15 minutes ISP in all control areas. In addition, it sets an obligation to the TSOs 
about the market time unit (MTU), which shall be equivalent to the boundaries of the 
imbalance settlement period. (EUR-Lex 2019b) Currently the imbalance settlement pe-
riod of 60 minutes is in use in the Nordics. Similarly, the market time unit is 60 minutes. 
Thus, the implementation of the requirements coming from the EBGL will shorten these 
time units to a quarter, which will have a great influence on the market behavior and 
power system balancing.  
3.1.4 Single price and single position imbalance model 
Imbalance pricing and calculation model is one of the key market design elements having 
an influence on the behavior of the balance responsible parties. The imbalance settlement 
process has many objectives. For instance, it should provide sufficient price signals that 
reflect the balancing situation of the power system. In addition, the price signals should 
reflect the real time value of energy. Briefly, the imbalance settlement should ensure that 
the incentives are adequate so that the BRPs are willing to be in balance or to support the 
system with imbalance mitigation. In order to prevent an unlevel playing field for the 
BRPs across Europe and between different countries, the EBGL obliges the TSOs to fur-
ther specify and harmonize imbalance settlement in accordance with Article 52(2). The 
article in question concerns the calculation of imbalances, its main components and the 
use of imbalance price mechanism. (EUR-Lex 2019b)  
 
The all TSOs’ proposal to further specify and harmonize imbalance settlement in accord-
ance with the abovementioned EBGL article 52(2) states that the European TSOs shall 
apply a single imbalance position for self-dispatching models, which concerns the Nordic 
TSOs. This is due to the fact that single position is more simple compared to the model 
of two positions. In addition, majority of the European TSOs utilize it already and from 
the BRP point of view, it will ease the control of imbalances. It is also noteworthy that 
the imbalance settlement based on single position model do not involve generation sched-
ules. (ENTSO-E 2018b) This implies that the Nordic TSOs, which calculate two separate 
imbalances need to change the basis of their imbalance calculation by implementing the 
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model of single imbalance, which is also referred to as single position. In addition, this 
means that the production plans will no longer be a part of the upcoming imbalance set-
tlement model.  
 
Along with the shift to single imbalance position, the all TSO proposal takes a stand on 
imbalance pricing mechanism. The EBGL obliges, that all the TSOs must put single im-
balance pricing into operation. However, the EBGL also lets the TSOs to define condi-
tions and methodology for applying dual imbalance pricing. According to the explanatory 
document of the all TSO proposal, an example of such a condition is a situation in which 
the system operator identifies an operational necessity to diminish the influence of over-
powering self-balancing of the BRPs, which may threaten the operational security. In 
such situations, the dual imbalance pricing may restrict the self-balancing behavior and 
reduce the risk of negative impacts. (ENTSO-E 2018b) The shift towards single pricing 
will mean a significant change to the Nordic TSOs, which apply dual pricing for the pro-
duction and single pricing for the consumption imbalance currently. In the future, pro-
duction and consumption are included in a single imbalance position and the single price 
mechanism is applied to the occurring imbalances.  
 
All of these key elements entail a multitude of changes and modification not only for the 
Nordic TSOs but also for all the Nordic stakeholders and market participants. Thus, the 
roadmap regarding the implementation of these elements is under a consultation process, 
which ensures that the stakeholders’ point of view related to the implementation schedule 
is also recognized (ENTSO-E 2019). The roadmap categorizes the changes into two gen-
erations: The first generation includes the Nordic aFRR and mFRR capacity markets, 
single price model, 15 minutes ISP and mFRR activation based on ACE. The second 
generation contains aFRR energy activation market and full ACE based balancing model 
implementation. (Svenska Kraftnät et al. 2019) 
 
The roadmap that is compiled by the Nordic TSOs includes a draft version of a timetable, 
which considers the first generation changes. The Nordic capacity market for automatic 
frequency restoration reserve has a go-live date in March 2020. The Nordic capacity mar-
ket for manual frequency restoration reserve has a go-live date in the third quarter of the 
year 2021. The implementation of 15 minutes imbalance settlement period will take place 
in the fourth quarter of the year 2022, which is an initial date that may change after the 
consultation process closes. Simultaneously with the introduction of 15 minutes ISP the 
market time unit of the intraday market will shift from 60 minutes to 15 minutes. The 
Nordic TSOs will start the activation of mFRR based on ACE in year 2023, which high-
lights the need for balancing process automation. The go-live date of single imbalance 
price and position will be determined after the consultation process, since the TSOs need 
time to weigh all the possible alternatives. Some of the activities require regulatory pro-
cesses and all of the changes are going to take a lot of modifications related to the opera-
tions and ICT-systems and hence, there may exist a demand for revising the draft timeta-
ble. The roadmap for the second generation changes will be clarified and published later 
on. (Svenska Kraftnät et al. 2019)  
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3.2 Fundamentals of area control error (ACE) 
In the cooperation agreement of the Nordic TSOs, area control error (ACE) is defined as 
a measure, which reflects the instantaneous power imbalance in an LFC area of the Nordic 
synchronous power system (Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018). On the other hand, 
according to EUR-Lex (2018a) the system operation guideline (SOGL) defines ACE as 
follows: “Area control error or ACE means the sum of the power control error (‘ΔP’), 
that is the real time difference between the measured actual real time power interchange 
value (‘P’) and the control program (‘P0’) of a specific LFC area or LFC block and the 
frequency control error (‘K*Δf’), that is the product of the K-factor and the frequency 
deviation of that specific LFC area or LFC block, where the area control error equals 
ΔP+K*Δf.” In other words, ∆P is the difference between the actual power flow and the 
scheduled power flow on all borders of an LFC area, whereas Δf is the difference between 
the actual frequency and the scheduled frequency. The K-factor is a bias factor, which is 
individually assessed for each LFC area. Ideally, a control area should only take care of 
the imbalances in that area and not counteract its primary reserve contribution, the self-
balancing of load or the auto-control of generation, which is why the bias factor K is 
needed. (Kundur 1994; Polajžer et al. 2018) ACE open loop is defined as the value of the 
ACE without any control processes (Nobel 2016). Basically, the area control error reflects 
the required power change in an LFC area. It is noteworthy, that frequency restoration 
control error (FRCE) is the control error for a frequency restoration process purposes and 
sometimes it is used as a substitute for the term ACE (Emissions-EUTS.com 2019b). 
Equation 2 below elaborates the calculation of area control error. 
 
 
                                      𝐴𝐶𝐸 =  ∑(𝑃𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠 − 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑡) − 𝐾(𝑓𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠 − 𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡)                             (2)  
 
Where, 
 
Pphys = Actual power flow on an LFC area border 
Pset = Scheduled power flow on an LFC area border 
K = Bias factor of an LFC area 
fphys = Actual LFC area frequency  
fset = Scheduled LFC area frequency  
 
The most common way to handle power system secondary control is by implementing 
automatic generation control (AGC). In order to control automatically the power and fre-
quency of power systems, the TSOs require proportional integral (PI) controllers. These 
controllers can work together with supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
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systems that are utilized by the TSOs to collect data related to the power system. The 
AGC controllers, which are called LFC controllers hereafter, send activation requests to 
the secondary control reserve resources in a way that is most economical and feasible to 
take care of the power system imbalances. (NERC 2011; Panwar & Chahar 2016) Equa-
tion 3 below shows an example formula, which can be utilized by an LFC controller to 
calculate the control signals (PAGC), which are sent to the reserve units that deliver the 
relevant amount of power. The ACE calculation provides the control error for the LFC 
controller and it works as a basis for calculating the control signals. The proportional term 
C typically varies between 0 and 0.5, and the integral term T varies between 50s and 200s. 
(Scherer 2016) With digital systems the experience has shown that the calculation of area 
control error and control signals once every 2 to 4 seconds leads to good performance 
(Kundur 1994). 
 
 
                                              𝑃𝐴𝐺𝐶 =  − (𝐶 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝐸 +
1
𝑇
∫ 𝐴𝐶𝐸 𝑑𝑡)                                       (3) 
 
Where, 
 
C = Proportional term 
ACE = Area control error 
T = Integral term 
 
Figure 12 below represents a basic ACE-based control structure of a system that takes 
advantage of four different control types. The illustrated LFC area in question uses fre-
quency containment process as the primary control of power. The frequency containment 
reserves (FCR) are adjusted by controllers that locally follow the power system fre-
quency. The secondary control, which can be called as automatic generation control 
(AGC), rely on frequency restoration process and more specifically, on automatic FRR. 
The PI controller, which can be referred to as LFC controller, uses area control error as a 
source information to calculate the control signals (PAGC) that are sent to the relevant 
automatic frequency restoration reserve units. The tertiary control is managed by carrying 
out manual actions. From a control point of view, the manual FRR and replacement re-
serves (RR) are identical, but they differ from each other in terms of activation time 
(Scherer 2016). Time control is also carried out by manual actions that can include the 
activation of mFRR or RR. All of these processes have an influence on the ACE calcula-
tion. The primary, secondary and tertiary control change the value of actual power flow, 
which is compared with the scheduled power flow. As the equation 2 and 3 above show, 
this alteration will change the area control error and thus, affect the operation of the LFC 
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controller, which in turn has an impact on the utilization of automatic frequency restora-
tion reserves. In addition, the time control affects the frequency deviation, which will 
change the value of the area control error.  
 
 
Figure 12: An elementary diagram depicting TSO control structure in a system that utilizes four-
level frequency control and is based on calculating area control error (Scherer 2016). 
 
TSOs that exercise ACE-based balancing try to return area control error close to zero (Liu 
et al. 2015). Zero ACE means that there are no instantaneous power imbalances in the 
control area and thus, the power system frequency is as desired. However, due to the 
nature of power systems, stochastic imbalances occur constantly, which brings on chal-
lenges concerning the pursuit of zero area control error. Therefore, it may be reasonable 
to set control performance criteria for the ACE-based balancing. According to Kundur 
(1994) the North American Reliability Council (NERC) has specified guidelines for the 
North American utilities. For normal conditions the following criteria apply: The area 
control error must equal to zero at least once every 10 minutes. In addition, the average 
ACE of each 10-minute period must follow specific limits that are determined taking into 
account the relevant control area characteristics. There are separate control performance 
criteria for the cases of disturbances: The ACE must return to zero after 10 minutes from 
the start of a disturbance at the latest. Additionally, the restoration process of the area 
control error must start not later than 1 minute from the start of a disturbance. Disturbance 
is a situation when the ACE is more than three times greater than the specific limits set 
for the normal operational conditions and it may be caused by a power plant trip or sudden 
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increment in consumption. In such situations, the utilization of manual actions and prod-
ucts is a necessity. 
3.3 Imbalance prognosis model 
The Nordic cooperation agreement obliges the TSOs to develop a prognosis model for 
each LFC area. The model should calculate power imbalance, which can be referred to as 
forecast of area control error, for the upcoming operating period. The resulting number 
should work as a source information for the determination of the manual frequency res-
toration reserve demand. (Affärverket Svenska kraftnät et al. 2018) In order to satisfy this 
obligation, Fingrid needs to create only one imbalance prognosis model, since Finland 
consists of only one LFC area. The inputs that are utilized by the prognosis model have 
an influence on the accuracy of the result and thus, from the balancing philosophy per-
spective, it is meaningful to consider more closely the components involved in the prog-
nosis calculation as the proactive design is highly dependent on forecasting. 
 
A high-level scheme of the prognosis model illustrated in figure 13 below is based on 
production forecast, consumption forecast and estimated power flows across the borders. 
The production forecast is based on the production plans of balance responsible parties 
that are submitted to Fingrid well before the upcoming operating period. The consump-
tion forecast is generated in Fingrid’s own systems and it is based on various data, for 
instance former consumption data and weather conditions. Along with these two ele-
ments, there is several cross border power flow estimations that need to be considered. 
The estimated power flow over Russia-Finland border is based on trades including both 
bilateral trades and Finland-Russia exchange (FRE) trades. The estimated power flow 
across Estonia-Finland border is also based on trades. The power flow between Sweden 
and Finland is based on trades taking into account two Swedish bidding zones: SE1 and 
SE3. When the estimated power flows and the consumption forecast are subtracted from 
the production forecast, the result is the predicted power surplus or deficit of Finland’s 
LFC area for the upcoming period of operation. Along with the discussed elements, the 
model may adopt correction factors that refine the accuracy of the prognosis. (Nevalainen 
2019) For example, if the production forecast is 6400 MW, the consumption forecast is 
8700 MW and the estimated overall power flow across the borders is 2580 MW of import, 
the result is surplus of 280 MW, which needs to be balanced away. However, the result 
is just an approximation, which is based on the assumption that the utilized source infor-
mation is accurate and reliable. The upcoming market changes will have a significant 
impact on the production plans, which will directly affect the discussed imbalance prog-
nosis model. Thus, it is reasonable to examine the usability of production plans in a more 
elaborate manner, which is done in chapter 4.4.  
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Figure 13: A high-level draft of Finland’s imbalance prognosis model. 
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3.4 From Nordic to European balancing markets 
One of the major goals of the electricity balancing guideline is to integrate and harmonize 
balancing markets and processes throughout Europe in a way that provides the European 
market participants with a level playing field. In order to satisfy this objective, some the 
technical specifications and requirements along with the market rules regarding balancing 
and balancing products need to be unified at European level. (ENTSO-E 2018c) The 
EBGL have set legal obligations for the TSOs concerning the integration and harmoniza-
tion of the manual and automatic frequency restoration reserves. The EBGL articles 20 
and 21 state that all the TSOs shall develop a proposal for the implementation framework 
for a European platform for the exchange of balancing energy from manual frequency 
restoration reserves and from automatic frequency restoration reserves, respectively. 
(EUR-Lex 2019b) Intuitively, the Nordic TSOs are obliged to join these platforms in the 
future, but additionally, the upcoming Nordic energy activation platforms for manual and 
automatic FRR will respect the design principles of their European counterparts. This 
chapter will discuss the technical requirements and processes that are introduced in the 
all TSO proposals regarding the European manual frequency restoration reserve platform 
(MARI) and the European automatic frequency restoration reserve platform (PICASSO). 
3.4.1 PICASSO 
PICASSO is the project name for the implementation of the European platform for the 
exchange of balancing energy from aFRR. The electricity balancing guideline not only 
obliges the TSOs to develop a framework for the European aFRR platform but also spe-
cifically obliges the TSOs to harmonize certain features of aFRR products and processes. 
Thus, the all TSO proposal defines the specifications of the standard product, the gate 
closure time for the standard aFRR balancing energy product bids (BEGCT) and the gate 
closure time for the transmission system operators to submit the bids further (TSO GCT). 
In addition, the proposal introduces a high-level scheme of the aFRR platform and its 
main functions. (ENTSO-E 2018d) 
 
The proposal considers minimum bid size, bid granularity, bid validity period and full 
activation time (FAT) as the specifications related to the standard product that are needed 
to be harmonized immediately from the start of the platform. Currently, the minimum bid 
size vary between 1 and 5 MW across Europe, but the TSOs preferred 1 MW as the min-
imum limit for the standard product. However, it can be revised, if the ICT-systems re-
markably slow down due to the increment in the number of bids. The maximum limit will 
be set to 9999 MW. The bid granularity will be equal to 1 MW meaning that the smallest 
difference between two bids is allowed to be 1 MW. The validity period will be set to 15 
minutes during which the TSO can accept a bid and request reserve resource activation 
from the balance service provider. Full activation time is also a feature that ranges broadly 
between the European countries: Some TSOs apply FAT of 2 minutes while others apply 
up to 15 minutes FAT. The TSOs have come to a conclusion that the standard aFRR 
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energy bid must be fully activated in 5 minutes after the activation request. Lastly, the 
BEGCT will be set to 25 minutes and the TSO GCT to 10 minutes. After the first gate 
closure, the TSOs will form local merit order lists (LMOL) including the bids the BSPs 
have submitted. Then the TSOs send the lists to the European aFRR platform, which 
creates a common merit order list (CMOL) for all the European bids based on the LMOLs. 
These gate closure times assure an adequate lead-time for the common platform and TSO 
processes. (ENTSO-E 2018d) 
 
The core of the aFRR platform is an activation optimization function (AOF), which re-
ceives inputs from the TSOs, that are controlling the LFC areas, and sends outputs to-
wards the TSOs as exemplified in figure 14 below. The inputs include the aFRR demand 
per LFC area calculated by the relevant TSOs. The aFRR demand is calculated for each 
control cycle and it reflects the LFC area imbalance before any aFRR activation, but con-
siders all the earlier processes that has been carried out for balancing purposes including, 
for example, mFRR activation. Along with the demand parameters, the AOF receives 
aFRR cross-border capacity limits, the local merit order lists discussed earlier and the 
operational security constraints from the TSOs that participate in the platform. In addi-
tion, the TSOs are responsible for updating the availability status of the bids: If an auto-
matic frequency restoration reserve balancing energy bid suddenly becomes unavailable, 
it must be notified to the aFRR platform.  After receiving all the required inputs from the 
participating TSOs, the AOF begins to determine the automatic frequency restoration re-
serve correction values for each LFC area. Following the optimization, the correction 
values are sent to the TSOs controlling the LFC areas. The sum of the correction value 
and the initial aFRR demand is the corrected demand for aFRR, which the LFC area itself 
has to take care of. (ENTSO-E 2018d) 
 
 
Figure 14: A high-level design of the European platform for automatic frequency restoration reserve 
(ENTSO-E 2018d). 
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3.4.2 MARI 
The EBGL obliges the TSOs to develop a framework concerning the implementation of 
the European manual frequency restoration reserve platform, which is called MARI. The 
all TSO proposal, which aims to fulfil the requirements of the obligation, defines common 
business processes and governance principles as well as the technical details of the plat-
form. Although the characteristics are integrated and harmonized, the TSOs can differ 
from each other in terms of activation philosophy: Some of the TSOs can take care of the 
forecasted imbalances by carrying out proactive processes while others may rely on reac-
tive real time balancing, which has a significant influence on how the manual and auto-
matic frequency restoration reserves are utilized. (ENTSO-E 2018c) This chapter will 
take a closer look at the standard product and process of the European mFRR platform.  
 
The TSOs have come to a following conclusion concerning the specifications of the stand-
ard manual FRR product: The full activation time will be set to 12.5 minutes and the 
minimum delivery period duration is set to 5 minutes during which the balance service 
provider must deliver the full requested power. The bid size can vary between 1 and 9999 
MW and the granularity will be 1 MW. The bids will have two activation types, which 
are scheduled activation and direct activation. The starting point of the scheduled activa-
tion is 7.5 minutes before the start of an operating quarter. After the starting point, the 
relevant BSP has 12.5 minutes of time to fully activate the power quantity of the bid. The 
BSP must deliver the full power for a minimum of 5 minutes. If a bid of the same BSP is 
not selected for delivery in the next operating quarter, the BSP must start to deactivate 
the bid, which should be completed within 12.5 minutes. The direct activation is other-
wise similar, but the earliest starting point is 7.5 minutes before the start of an operating 
period and the latest starting point is 7.5 minutes after the start of an operating period. 
Briefly, the scheduled activation request from the TSO to the BSP takes place at a specific 
point in time, but the direct activation request can be sent more freely. Therefore, the 
scheduled activation product is typically utilized to release previously activated aFRR or 
to take care of forecasted imbalances proactively and the direct activation product is used 
to mitigate large imbalances within operating period. (ENTSO-E 2018c) Figure 15 below 
elaborates the shapes of the mFRR standard products. BSP GCT is the gate closure time 
for the bids submitted by the BSPs.  
 
 
Figure 15: Example shapes of the scheduled and direct activation product types (ENTSO-E 2018c). 
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The activation optimization function (AOF) of the European manual frequency restora-
tion reserve platform will follow two basic optimization principles. First, the AOF aims 
to maximize the mFRR economic surplus and second, it tries to minimize the exchange 
of mFRR on borders. The inputs that the AOF receives are the merit order lists including 
mFRR balancing energy bids collected by the TSOs, the balancing energy demands cal-
culated by the TSOs and various constraints related to the system security and cross bor-
der capacity. Then, the AOF calculates an outcome that is feasible taking into account the 
set constraints and the optimization principles. The outputs include various data and, from 
the activation point of view, the most essential is the information concerning the accepted 
balancing energy bids and the satisfied balancing energy demands. After receiving the 
results from the European mFRR platform, the TSOs send the activation signals to the 
selected BSPs possessing the reserve resources. (ENTSO-E 2018c)  
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4 Balancing philosophy design principles 
The upcoming changes related to the development of Nordic power system balancing will 
change the balancing responsibilities of each Nordic TSO and refine the incentives that 
direct the behavior of the balance responsible parties. Along with these modifications, the 
balancing product marketplaces and specifications will change, which influences the 
availability and usability of the balancing products. This chapter discusses how the vari-
ous changes affect the balancing philosophy and design of Fingrid and the Finnish power 
system. First, the different market solutions are considered more closely. Second, the us-
ability of production plans is analyzed. Third, the availability of frequency restoration 
reserves is speculated and lastly, the economic optimization point of view is dealt with. 
These principles determine the conclusions and recommendations that are given related 
to the future balancing philosophy of the Finnish power system. 
4.1 Market solutions 
4.1.1 Shortening of imbalance settlement period 
One of the upcoming market changes is the implementation of 15 minutes imbalance 
settlement period (ISP) and market time unit (MTU), which are both 60 minutes currently. 
BRPs are financially responsible for their imbalances over the imbalance settlement pe-
riod and thus, they try to achieve hourly balanced positions in order to avoid imbalance 
costs. However, during the operating hour, instantaneous imbalances take place, and these 
can net out over the 60 minutes period. If a BRP causes a negative and a positive imbal-
ance during the hour, but they are equal in size, the cumulative imbalance is zero and 
therefore, the BRP will not face any costs due to the netting out of imbalances. (Copen-
hagen Economics 2017) Figure 16 below illustrates a real example of how large produc-
tion imbalances can net out over the operating hours. The blue line represents actual elec-
tricity production in Finland in the morning of January 16, 2019 and the orange line rep-
resents the hourly production averages, which can be thought as the hourly scheduled 
production positions of the BRPs. The data for the actual electricity production is re-
trieved from Fingrid’s open data website. As can be observed, deviations between actual 
production and scheduled hourly production positions presented in the lower graph take 
place continuously and the highest imbalance peaks are quite notable. However, the peaks 
net out over the hours, since the positive and negative deviations are equally sized within 
the hours. The lowest peak is -351 MW and the highest peak is 219 MW. 
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Figure 16: The blue line represents actual production, the orange line represents hourly scheduled 
production positions and the red line represents the deviations between the two in Finland between 
00:00 – 12:00 in the morning of January 16, 2019. 
 
The introduction of 15 minutes imbalance settlement period will change the situation as 
the imbalances netting out over the hour period will become visible with the 15 minutes 
ISP. Therefore, the BRPs will face imbalance costs, if they continue to take positions on 
hourly basis. On the other hand, they can refine their behavior and start taking quarterly 
positions and as a result, they can avoid the newly settled imbalance costs. With quarterly 
system, the netting out of positive and negative imbalances is reduced. (Copenhagen Eco-
nomics 2017) Figure 17 below illustrates a real example of how large deviations can net 
out over the operating quarters. The blue line represents actual electricity production in 
Finland in the morning of January 16, 2019 and the orange line represents the quarterly 
production averages, which can be considered as the quarterly scheduled production po-
sitions of the BRPs. The actual production data is retrieved from Fingrid’s open data 
website. Similarly as in the figure with hourly averages, the red area illustrates the devi-
ations between the actual production and quarterly averages. Now the lowest peak is -156 
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MW and the highest peak is 159 MW. Thus, with quarterly scheduling the instantaneous 
imbalances will decrease as the operating period shortens and the possibility for netting 
out of energies lowers.   
 
 
 
Figure 17: The blue line represents actual production, the orange line represents quarterly scheduled 
production positions and the red line represents the deviations between the two in Finland between 
00:00 – 12:00 in the morning of January 16, 2019. 
 
The introduction of 15 minutes resolution will be beneficial from the system balancing 
point of view as the netting out of imbalances will decrease and the imbalance settlement 
will be more in line with the actual imbalances. However, it should be noted that the 
above example does not reflect perfectly the imbalances taking place. Firstly, the instan-
taneous power system imbalances do not happen only because of the actual production 
deviating from the scheduled production, since the imbalances are also dependent on the 
actual consumption. Although the example shows that the largest deviation peaks be-
tween actual production and scheduled production positions can be reduced by over 50 
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%, this does not mean that the imbalances decrease the same amount. Secondly, the ex-
ample assumes that the BRPs will and are able to schedule their production and take po-
sitions on quarterly basis, which is not necessarily true. The incentives that come from 
the imbalance settlement, however, encourage the BRPs to do so, because otherwise they 
will face imbalance costs. 
 
Along with the reduction of netting out of imbalances, the introduction of 15 minutes time 
resolution will entail other advantages too. The net system imbalances will decrease be-
tween 1.5 to 6.1 % in the Nordic power system. The lowest rate assumes that the BRPs 
will trade away 25 % of the newly settled imbalances on the intraday market and the 
highest rate assumes that all the newly settled imbalances are traded. Instead of the intra-
day trading, another option for the BRPs is to adjust their flexible production or consump-
tion in order to tackle the imbalances. In addition to the lower net system imbalances, the 
jumps between balance positions will become smaller when the balancing period shortens 
from 60 to 15 minutes. In Finland, the jumps around period shifts will reduce approxi-
mately 23 % and the reduction will be most remarkable in situations in which the sizes of 
the jumps are highest, for example during morning hours when production and consump-
tion are ramping up. (Copenhagen Economics 2017) All in all, with 15 minutes ISP and 
MTU the market participants are able to achieve balanced positions and handle their ex-
pected imbalances in a more accurate manner, since the balancing horizon shortens and 
the BRPs have better understanding about the upcoming period of operation. Moreover, 
the balance positions of adjacent periods are closer to each other when the length of bal-
ancing period is 15 minutes instead of 60 minutes, which smooths system operations. 
 
As mentioned above, the possibility for large jumps reduces when the balancing and pro-
duction scheduling timespan shortens. This is exemplified more closely in figure 18 be-
low. The data for actual production is retrieved from Fingrid’s open data website. The 
illustrative example in question shows that the gap between hourly positions is 498 MW. 
The same gap decreases down to 226 MW when the positions are taken on quarterly basis 
and the other jumps are even smaller. The highest jump is reduced by more than a half, 
which eases system operation as the changes between balancing periods are steadier than 
before. It should be noted that the figure only illustrates limited sample of actual produc-
tion in a January morning and thus, the results of this examination are only suggestive. 
For example, during afternoons the reduction of jump sizes may not be that significant. 
In addition, the analysis is based on actual production that has taken place when the ISP 
has been 60 minutes and thus, the production pattern represents hourly operation. As can 
be observed, at the beginning of both hours the production ramps up and then stabilizes, 
which is common behavior on hourly system. Therefore, when 15 minutes ISP is intro-
duced, the profile of the production curve will supposedly change to represent quarterly 
system: In the beginning of each quarter, there may appear a slight ramp up and then 
again, the profile flattens out. However, it is evident that the sizes of the jumps will de-
crease.   
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Figure 18: In both graphs, the blue line represents actual production in Finland between 07:00 – 
09:00 in the morning of January 16, 2019. In the upper graph, the orange line represents hourly 
scheduled production positions, whereas in the lower graph the orange line represents quarterly 
scheduled production positions.  
 
The length of imbalance settlement period is one of the key design variables related to 
proactive and reactive balancing market designs. Håberg & Doorman (2016) have dis-
cussed different balancing activation philosophies and the influence of imbalance settle-
ment period on them in Northern European area. Their study states that short imbalance 
settlement period supports reactive designs, whereas long ISP leaves room for the TSOs 
to proactively make decisions about balancing product activation.  
 
There are quite a few reasons why reactive designs are joint together with shorter imbal-
ance settlement periods. Some of the reasons are discussed above: Firstly, the reduction 
in netting out of imbalances results in lower balancing necessities inside the operating 
periods and thus, the needed reactions can be slighter and the balancing volumes smaller. 
Secondly, the net system imbalances will reduce, which lowers the need for balancing 
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actions further as the BRPs can adjust their positions more accurately closer to real time. 
Thirdly, the consecutive positions of the BRPs will be closer to each other as the period 
shortens. This decreases the size of position jumps, which eases system operations and 
the TSOs do not need to reckon with large changes proactively. Along with these aspects, 
the shift from 60 to 15 minutes imbalance settlement period works as an indicator that the 
transmission system operators are willing to give more responsibility for the balance re-
sponsible parties regarding balancing. Short ISP ensures that the BRPs will contribute 
more efficiently to the balancing process as the quarterly settled imbalances and price 
signals will encourage the BRPs to adjust positions more frequently. This together with 
the shortened planning horizon will improve the accuracy and performance of market 
behavior of the BRPs and thus, the need for proactive TSO procedures declines.  
4.1.2 Change of imbalance settlement model 
The current imbalance settlement model, which is based on calculating and settling pro-
duction and consumption imbalances separately, will be updated to single position model. 
In addition, single pricing will be applied to the single position. These changes mean that 
a single imbalance volume calculation will include both production and consumption and 
the production plans will not be included in the calculation. Additionally, the prices for 
positive and negative imbalances will be identical. (Fingrid 2019g) 
 
Nowadays the model of two separate imbalances incentivizes balance responsible parties 
to submit accurate production plans of a good quality to the TSOs and to follow the pro-
duction plans as precisely as possible. Balance responsible parties that deviate from the 
scheduled production will not gain any extra profit compared to day-ahead trading, but 
instead they will expose themselves to a risk of additional costs. Thus, the imbalance 
pricing mechanism has not incentivized the BRPs to aspire intentional production imbal-
ances – not even in the correct direction in order to help the system with imbalance miti-
gation. Since the TSOs have had rather good understanding about the operations of BRPs 
during the upcoming period of operation based on the binding production plans, they have 
been able to determine the utilization and activation of balancing products proactively.  
 
After the introduction of the new single price and single position model, the financial 
incentives will change and therefore, the BRP cost optimization concerning the produc-
tion and consumption portfolio will be affected. The new model encourages BRPs to op-
erate their adjustable production or consumption so that they can cause imbalances over 
the imbalance settlement period as long as they are in the main regulation direction. This 
way the BRPs can help the TSOs to manage system imbalances and simultaneously make 
more profit than with the current settlement and pricing model (van der Veen et al. 2012). 
 
This naturally affects the way in which the system should be balanced as the new settle-
ment and pricing model will make it harder to predict the BRP behavior in advance. BRPs 
need to submit production plans to the TSOs as before, but they are not financially binding 
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and deviations from the plans can be economic over the imbalance settlement period. This 
means that the relevance of the production plans will lower, since the BRPs might want 
to cause imbalances intentionally, i.e. exercise self-balancing. As the prognosis model of 
the upcoming operating period presented in chapter 3.3 relies on the BRP production 
plans, the proactive decision-making of the TSOs concerning balancing will lose ground. 
The production plans will only be the best guess of how the market participants will be-
have, but actually, the BRPs may want to operate differently depending on the underlying 
profits. Figure 19 below shows how the activation philosophies of the TSOs are linked to 
the BRP incentives in northern European area. Stronger incentives for the BRPs support 
reactive balancing design and with weaker incentives, the balancing is more in the hands 
of the TSOs, which can proactively determine the activation of balancing products before 
the operating period. The changes related to the imbalance settlement will strengthen the 
BRP incentives and Fingrid should promote reactive activations based on the figure be-
low. 
 
 
Figure 19: Interdependence between TSO balancing design and BRP incentives (Håberg & Doorman 
2016). 
 
A few aspects, however, are limiting the degree of intentional imbalances of the BRPs. 
Firstly, the size of a BRP has an influence on the profitability of self-balancing. Large 
BRPs can affect the system imbalance more than smaller BRPs, and thus, the large players 
can make less profit from single price mechanism than their smaller counterparts when 
having imbalances in the correct direction (van der Veen et al. 2012). This indicates that 
the volume of self-balancing during the operating period is restricted by the markets, since 
the profitability of imbalances decrease when the capability to cause them increases. Sec-
ondly, legal obligations are limiting the behavior of the BRPs. In order to take full ad-
vantage of the self-balancing effectively, the BRPs should have legal permission to help 
the system with their intentional imbalances (Hirth & Ziegenhagen 2015). However, in 
the Nordics the BRPs have a balance obligation (eSett 2019). This means that they must 
try to hold balanced positions on regular basis and therefore, self-balancing is against the 
rules. Third aspect to be considered is the availability of real time balancing information. 
If the BRPs are willing to cause imbalances in the right direction, it requires knowledge 
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of balancing direction, volumes and prices. High uncertainties related to the direction and 
prices decrease the attractiveness of choosing intentional imbalances as a strategic path 
(Schraff & Amelin 2016). In the Nordics, the balancing prices and volumes are not pub-
lished in real time, but instead 60 minutes afterwards on Nord Pool website (ENTSO-E 
2016). Thus, the BRPs will face a risk of additional costs, if they primarily try to achieve 
imbalanced positions, which reduces the incentive to behave in such a manner. Lastly, as 
discussed in chapter 3.1.4, the transmission system operator may apply dual pricing, if 
the self-balancing of the BRPs is too overpowering. This should restrict the BRP behavior 
and prevent major mistakes. In addition, it should be noted that if the imbalance prices do 
not differ from the day-ahead market price significantly, the incentives are not strong 
enough to direct the operations of the BRPs. 
 
Even though the shift to single position and single price model can lead up to uncertainty 
concerning the operations of the BRPs, the above-mentioned aspects restrict intentional 
imbalances. It seems that the publication of real time balancing information is very central 
when considering the influences of single price model on the TSO activation philosophy. 
If the TSOs continue to publish relevant balancing information afterwards, the production 
plans of BRPs might represent their behavior quite well also in the future, which supports 
the proactive decision-making and activation of the balancing products beforehand the 
operating period. On the other hand, without proper real time understanding, the BRPs 
may act in a false manner. If the TSOs improve the availability of the real time balancing 
data, the BRPs can support system balancing and the TSOs can rely on reactive balancing 
actions as the BRPs will chase after positions that support the whole system. Undoubt-
edly, the BRPs may overreact to the signals, but then the feedback loop based on the 
incentives should refine the behavior of the BRPs as they should see how their behavior 
influences on the imbalance costs. 
4.1.3 Intraday market development 
Along with the market changes that are implemented due to the electricity balancing 
guideline (EBGL), intraday market will undergo modification in Finland. Intraday trading 
can be seen as a profitable business, since it allows the market participants to trade away 
imbalances and therefore, to decrease imbalance costs. Expected imbalance costs corre-
lates with the willingness-to-sell and willingness-to-buy of the market participants and 
with intraday trading BRPs can hedge against volatile imbalance prices, which can be 
seen as the main motivation for entering intraday markets (Schraff & Amelin 2016). 
 
From the TSO and balancing point of view, intraday market trading is central. The Nordic 
synchronous system is under a reformation of production palette as the conventional and 
adjustable production facilities are phasing out from the system and they are substituted 
by variable renewable energy sources (vRES), especially wind power. On average the 
forecasts related to the intermittent production become more precise when getting closer 
to real time as the forecast horizon shorten and the weather forecasts and measurements 
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provide more accurate data. Thus, the market participants have better understanding about 
their scheduled production and supposed deviations on intraday market than on day-ahead 
market, and they can perform trading in more exact manner. Therefore, well-functioning 
intraday markets can decrease the volume of activated balancing services (Schraff & 
Amelin 2016).  
 
Recent discussion in Finland has brought out possible intraday market developments that 
could take place in the near future. Nord Pool has made a proposal for changing the in-
traday gate closure time together with the implementation of 15 minutes imbalance set-
tlement period. The change could be introduced in Finland as there are no legislative 
restrictions concerning internal trading in a bidding zone. The proposal suggests that the 
intraday gate closure time for internal trading could be 0 minutes, which enables trading 
of energy as close to real time as possible. (Fingrid 2019h) This change is likely to get 
support from market participants who utilize intraday market to trade away imbalances 
and aim to reach balanced positions, for instance, according to wind power forecasts that 
become more accurate closer to real time as the forecast horizons shorten. On the other 
hand, for some thermal power plants the rescheduling of production can be limited and 
bring additional costs, if it takes place just before the gate closure. Nonetheless, most of 
the intraday trades occur just a few hours before the period of delivery in the Nordic 
region, although the market is continuous. (Schraff & Amelin 2016)  
 
Trading activity of Finnish market participants is illustrated in figure 20, which shows 
how the intraday trades has taken place before the delivery period in Finland in 2018. The 
highest peak represents intraday trading just before the cross-zonal gate closure time, 
which is 60 minutes before the delivery in Europe. The second highest peak represents 
the trading just before the intraday gate closure of Finland-Estonia border, which is, ex-
ceptionally, 30 minutes before the delivery. It can be interpreted from the figure that the 
Finnish market participants are most active just before the gate closures. This indicates 
that there exist a demand for energy trading closer to real time, which could support power 
system balancing and lessen the need for balancing product activation as the BRPs could 
balance themselves in a more accurate manner. 
 
 
Figure 20: Volume of intraday trading in GWh as a function of minutes before the delivery of energy 
in Finland in 2018 (Fingrid 2019h). 
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As mentioned, well-designed intraday market can support power system balancing and 
decrease the volume of activated balancing products. However, a few aspects reduce the 
potential of intraday trading to support system balancing. As the trading is dependent on 
the willingness-to-sell and willingness-to-buy of market participants, the trades that take 
place should benefit both the buyers and the sellers. Schraff & Amelin (2016) investigated 
in their study the trading behavior of market participants on the Nordic intraday market. 
A part of the study brought out a result indicating that a two-price system is more bene-
ficial for the market participants than a one-price system, if the market participants do not 
refine their market behavior. This is based on the assumption, that the market participants 
only enter the intraday markets in order to decrease their expected imbalance costs and in 
addition, they are risk-neutral and have mutual understanding about the expected balanc-
ing direction and prices. In such a situation, the buyer would like to purchase energy at a 
price that is lower or equal to the expected balancing price. On the other hand, the seller 
is willing to sell, if the price is at least the expected balancing price. Thus, the equilibrium 
price equals to the expected balancing price, which decreases the attractiveness of intra-
day trading as no additional profit can be gained. However, these assumptions rarely hold 
true in the real world. Along with the imbalance cost reduction, the market participants 
might have other underlying motivations, such as the possibility to optimize own produc-
tion and consumption facilities, if their variable costs are higher compared to buying en-
ergy from the intraday markets. In addition, the market participants are not always risk-
neutral so they may be willing to add risk premiums to the prices. Lastly, the understating 
about balancing prices and direction may differ and thus, the market participants trade 
with different expectations. 
 
Another aspect, which restricts the benefits related to the intraday trading, is the lack of 
recent knowledge of balancing situation. Market participants have limited and varying 
capability to form expectations of the upcoming balancing prices and volumes and hence, 
they are exposed to considerable uncertainties. This has two influences on the intraday 
trading. Firstly, the threshold to enter the market is higher as the profitability is precarious 
and secondly, there exists a time lag that restricts the balancing benefits from the system 
point of view. The latter means that intraday trading is prone to react with some delay to 
the balancing situation and price development and therefore, the trading on intraday mar-
ket do not directly reflect the change in the balancing situation and the actions of market 
participants do not support the system balancing as efficiently as they could. (Schraff & 
Amelin 2016) One key enabler in order to improve intraday trading is to publish balancing 
prices earlier. Balancing information transparency would ensure a level playing field for 
all the market participants and in addition, the market actions would help TSOs with sys-
tem imbalance mitigation as the trading could react to the balancing situation changes and 
price development in a more agile manner. 
 
Overall, the shortening of intraday gate closure time is a step having an influence on the 
balancing responsibility. It creates a possibility for the BRPs to achieve balance until the 
start of an operating period, which reduces the need for proactive balancing product acti-
vation, since the imbalances are handled by market-based actions of the BRPs. A few 
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aspects, however, may more or less obstruct the last-minute intraday trading as discussed 
above, but at least shortening of the gate closure time works as an indicator for the BRPs 
that the relevant TSO is willing to rely on the market participants and solutions. This 
increases the responsibility of the BRPs, but on the other hand, they can utilize their assets 
more efficiently and potentially yield more profit. Reactive balancing designs are charac-
terized by intraday gate closure times equal to zero, whereas proactive TSOs support a 
gap between gate closure time and real time in order to ensure sufficient leeway for de-
termining necessary proactive balancing product activations (Håberg & Doorman 2016). 
By letting the BRPs to control imbalances up to the last minute, the relevant TSO needs 
to carry out only reactive balancing actions in order to take care of the stochastic imbal-
ances occurring during the period of operation.  
 
Another possible solution to realize the potential and benefits of intraday trading from 
balancing perspective is to introduce intraday auctions. As the Nordic intraday market 
tends to have rather low liquidity, auctions might improve the situation. Scharff & Amelin 
(2016) have brought out an observation, that the intraday trading is most likely done man-
ually and not all the participants follow the market round the clock in the Nordics. In 
addition, more active monitoring increases transaction costs, but simultaneously the prob-
ability of trading profitability rises. Moreover, large price variations take place on the 
intraday market. To overcome these flaws, they suggest that a discrete intraday auction 
with marginal pricing should be analyzed more profoundly and the possible benefits 
should be discussed. For instance, Spanish intraday market has succeeded to lower the 
trading price risk and reduce the overall transaction costs by including six auctions during 
the day of delivery (Weber 2010). It is noteworthy, that the Spanish intraday market has 
considerably high trading volumes compared to the other intraday markets in the EU area 
(Chaves-Ávila & Fernandes 2015). Thus, the introduction of auctions might possibly im-
prove the liquidity of intraday market, as the trading would be more sensible for the mar-
ket participants. This, in turn, would benefit the whole system as the BRPs would have 
better market tools to trade away imbalances and therefore, they would be balanced more 
precisely before the real time operation, which would lessen the need for proactive TSO 
balancing. 
 
The German example has shown how the well designed and well-functioning short-term 
wholesale electricity trading has successfully contributed to the reduction of balancing 
reserve utilization. Between years 2011 and 2017 the installed capacity of solar and wind 
power has increased from 54 GW to 99 GW in Germany. As these generation forms pro-
duce electricity intermittently depending on the weather circumstances, the operational 
forecasts related to them are not perfectly accurate. Thus, it is well justified to assume 
that such a remarkable increase in wind and solar power capacity would have increased 
the need for balancing product activations and capacity procurement. However, the total 
amount of frequency restoration reserves procured by the German TSOs has decreased 
20% between 2011 and 2017. In addition, the activation of frequency restoration reserves 
has decreased from well above 7 TWh in year 2011 to 2.5 TWh in year 2017 as presented 
in figure 21 below. Simultaneously, the ratio of mFRR to aFRR has changed, since the 
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usage of mFRR has shrunk near to zero. Such changes has been possible partly because 
of the improved international cooperation of TSOs, which includes imbalance netting, but 
this aspect alone does not explain the reduction in the procurement and activation of fre-
quency restoration reserves, because simultaneously the electricity market activities have  
developed remarkably. (Koch & Hirth 2018)  
 
 
Figure 21: Activated balancing energy in TWh in Germany during 2011-2017 (Koch & Hirth 2018). 
 
The above-mentioned German balancing paradox suggests that market-based solutions 
are working efficiently and they have improved the balancing situation. One of the key 
changes has been the development of intraday market: The trading volumes have in-
creased quickly while the reserves activated by TSOs has declined. The growth of yearly 
trading volume has been more than 600% from 2012 to 2017 as shown in figure 22 below. 
On the German intraday market the gate closure of the continuous trading takes place 30 
minutes before real time. After that starts an extended trading, which is open until 5 
minutes before real time. The extended trading is, however, possible only within a bal-
ancing area, of which there are four in total in Germany. Along with continuous trading, 
there is also intraday auction that was introduced in December 2014. The intraday auction 
has achieved a dominant position in terms of trading volume as more than half of the 
volume was traded on the auctions in 2017. Simultaneously as the volumes have in-
creased, trading round the clock and closer to real time has become more popular, which 
can be observed especially during off peak times, such as nights and weekends. (Koch & 
Hirth 2018) Well-functioning intraday market together with quarterly products and 15 
minutes imbalance settlement period has succeeded to reduce deterministic imbalances 
in Germany. Proper incentives and market design perform as an efficient tool for balanc-
ing, which shifts the balancing responsibility from the TSOs to the market participants. 
Thus, the TSOs do not need to involve themselves in proactive balancing, because the 
system can rely on market-based solutions and the BRPs are balanced more accurately. 
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Figure 22: Yearly intraday trading volumes in TWh in Germany (Koch & Hirth 2018). 
4.2 Usability of production plans 
The ongoing balancing process in the Nordic synchronous system is highly dependent on 
various data, which helps the TSOs to forecast upcoming events within the operating pe-
riods. The information available beforehand is utilized as a basis for proactive decision 
making regarding system balancing and therefore, for instance, the TSOs are able to de-
termine the volume and direction of manual frequency restoration reserve that needs to 
be activated proactively. Production plans are a corner stone of the planning and the TSOs 
receive them from the balance responsible parties well in advance. Production plans will 
also be a part of the imbalance prognosis that is calculated for every upcoming balancing 
period in the future when ACE-based balancing model is introduced. This chapter will 
discuss the usability of production plans in the future more profoundly, since it has an 
influence on the balancing philosophy.  
 
One intuitive aspect related to the usability of production plans is to consider the errors 
they tend to contain. Especially interesting is to study if the volumes of the deviations 
between actual production and production plans have grown due to the increase in inter-
mittent and weather-dependent production. According to Chang et al. (2013) the exist-
ence of prediction errors is one of the greatest challenges that arise from increasing the 
penetration of wind power in power systems. The prediction errors can vary from 25 to 
40 % of the installed wind power capacity at the highest when forecasting is made for the 
day-ahead market trading purposes. This indicates that the system level deviations be-
tween planned production and actual production should increase synchronously with the 
growth of wind power capacity and production. 
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Wind power capacity and production have multiplied in Finland during the past decade 
as shown in figure 23 below. In year 2009 the capacity was 146 MW and the volume of 
production was 277 GWh. In year 2018 the same numbers were 2041 MW and 5857 
GWh, respectively. Thus, the growth of wind power has been considerable: The capacity 
has increased more than ten times and the production volume has increased more than 
twenty times in ten years. Wind power accounted for 9 % of the total electricity produc-
tion in Finland in 2018. (Energiateollisuus 2019a) If these numbers are evaluated from 
the balancing point of view, one could suggest that wind power has had some influence 
on the deviations between actual production and planned production on system level. If 
the above-mentioned error range is applied, the wind power prediction errors varied from 
510 MW to 816 MW at the highest in year 2018. Naturally, it should be noted that solar 
power is also intermittent and weather-dependent production and similarly it is prone to 
prediction errors. However, solar power accounted only for 0.2 % of the total electricity 
production in Finland in 2018 (Energiateollisuus 2019a). Thus, it is well justified to leave 
solar power out of further discussion.  
 
 
Figure 23: Installed wind power capacity in MW and yearly wind power production in GWh in Fin-
land (Energiateollisuus 2019a). 
 
In order to examine the differences that have taken place between planned and actual 
production on system level in Finland, planned production and production imbalance ad-
justments need to be subtracted from actual production on hourly basis. The result of this 
calculation is the total prediction error of the production in Finland, which is actually the 
same as the production imbalance power. Appendix A shows the calculated deviations 
for the time gap from 2009 to 2018. The production imbalance adjustments that are taken 
into account include FCR-N and both manual and automatic frequency restoration re-
serves. FCR-D, which also belongs to the frequency containment reserves, is ignored, 
since it is activated rarely and there is no easily accessible and relevant data available. 
The data utilized is retrieved from Fingrid’s open data website and Fingrid’s internal data 
systems. The largest deviation peaks are filtered out of the results as in most of the cases 
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they are only computational faults due to poor data quality. To compare the years with 
each other, figure 24 below shows some annual key figures that are calculated based on 
the absolute values of the deviations. Mean is the central number of the values and it can 
be understood as the expected value. Median is the value, which separates the lower half 
of the results from the higher half. Standard deviation quantifies how spread out the val-
ues are, i.e. how far away the values tend to be from the mean. Cumulative distribution 
function pictures how likely a random deviation will be less than or equal to a value cho-
sen from the x-axis. If the function increases steeply, the probability of small deviations 
is high and if the function rises gently, the probability of large deviations is high. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: The upper graph represents the key figures and the lower graph represents the cumulative 
distribution functions of the absolute deviations between planned production and actual production 
in Finland between 2009 and 2018. 
 
The graphs above show that between 2009 and 2018 in Finland there have been some 
fluctuations in the key figures, but the changes have not followed a distinct trend. Over 
the first five years, the key figures remained almost unchanged or increased slightly. 
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Thereafter the decline in key figures took place and 2015 was the year of lowest key 
figures. From this moment onwards, mean, median and standard deviation increased 
every year, except the standard deviation of 2018 diverted from the growth trend. Thus, 
there is no clear and unambiguous trend for change, which could be easily observed from 
the sample. However, all of the key figures have declining trend lines, which indicates 
that the deviations between production plans and actual production have decreased on 
average between 2009 and 2018 in Finland. 
According to the above examination, it is not justified to assume that the increase in wind 
power capacity and production have weakened the usability of production plans on sys-
tem level in Finland. However, there are a couple of underlying aspects that need to be 
considered. First, the imbalance settlement model, which was introduced in 2009, empha-
sizes production planning, since the model creates an incentive for the BRPs to generate 
and submit accurate hourly plans and to stick to them to the best of their ability. By min-
imizing the deviations between production plans and actual production, the BRPs can 
hedge themselves against imbalance costs and on the other hand, even if the imbalances 
are to the right direction and support the system, the BRPs do not gain any extra profit. 
Hence, there have been interests to compensate occurring prediction errors with adjusta-
ble generation in real time and to develop better prognosis systems in order to create more 
accurate predictions.  
Secondly, due to the nature of the examination, extreme occasions and highest peaks are 
not paid much attention. Wind power production may increase the number of extreme 
deviations between actual production and production plans, but based on the above ex-
amination alone it is hard to say if this is true or not – at least the increment in wind power 
has not increased the deviations on average. The extreme occasions are hardest from the 
system balancing point of view and the influence of wind power on them could be inves-
tigated by calculating the deviations between planned and actual wind power production 
and comparing the results with the above examination, which represents Finland’s whole 
production fleet. This would show if the system level deviation peaks are caused by wind 
power.  
Third, forecasting of wind power production has gained much attention due to the expan-
sion of wind power capacity in recent years and therefore, research and development re-
lated to wind power predictions have been very active (Foley et al. 2012). By utilizing 
advanced methods, it has been possible to create considerably better wind power predic-
tions compared to the older forecasting models (Jung & Broadwater 2014). Thus, between 
2009 and 2018 the amount of wind power has multiplied, but simultaneously the predic-
tion models have become more advanced and accurate.  
Fourth, all of the years have been different in terms of weather circumstances, consump-
tion, availability and usage of production et cetera. Thus, it is hard to prove what the effect 
of wind power is as there are so many other things influencing on the power system op-
erations. On the other hand, if wind power production does not stand out despite the other 
affecting aspects, then its effect can be considered insignificant.  
Fifth, the examination do not take into account the changes in annual electricity produc-
tion, which has varied between 2009 and 2018. For example, in 2010 the total electricity 
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production was 77.2 TWh whereas in 2015 the same number was 66.1 TWh (Ener-
giateollisuus 2019b). This in turn can partly explain why the deviation key figures were 
higher in 2010 than in 2015 – presumably higher production rates result in higher devia-
tions. Sixth, the accuracy of this examination in question is varying. Some of the datasets 
had rather low quality as there were time gaps missing the relevant data. Thus, the blanks 
needed to be filled with approximated values, which may have skewed the results. 
Another interesting aspect related to the usability of production plans is the occurrence 
nature of the deviations between production plans and actual production. Figure 25 below 
includes two graphs: The upper one represents how the deviations have occurred on av-
erage per operating hour between 2009 and 2018 and the lower graph shows the average 
electricity production power per operating hour for the same time period. 
 
 
Figure 25: The upper graph represents average absolute deviations in MW between production plans 
and actual production per operating hour and the lower graph represents average electricity pro-
duction power per operating hour in Finland between 2009 and 2018. 
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One intuitive observation is that the deviations seem to have followed the production 
pattern: During high production hours, the deviations have also been high and similarly, 
with lower production rates the deviations have tended to be lower. However, this is not 
the only factor explaining the magnitude of the deviations. It seems that every time the 
trend of the production has been either increasing or decreasing, the deviations have been 
higher than during the steady production periods. For instance, the average production 
has been relatively low at 06:00 compared to the afternoon hours. Nevertheless, the aver-
age deviation of the sixth operating hour is on the same level with the deviations of the 
afternoon hours. It is noteworthy that the sixth operating hour is the hour when the pro-
duction has started to ramp up in the morning, which means that the state of the produc-
tion has been changing. The same applies to the early hours: The production volumes 
have been comparatively low, but the deviations for the hours have been high. The pro-
duction pattern shows that during the early hours the production has been declining on 
average. These findings indicate, that the periods of change are harder to predict on an 
accurate manner as the production plans tend to be less reliable.   
It is good to acknowledge that there are also other factors influencing on the deviations 
between production plans and actual production that cannot be interpreted directly from 
the graphs in the figure above. For example, around the day shifts the changes related to 
the planned production can be high (ENTSO-E 2016). Thus, along with declining pro-
duction, the actions around day shift can be a contributory cause for the high deviations 
in the early hours. Moreover, not all of the balance responsible parties observe electricity 
markets around the clock (Schariff & Amelin 2016). This fact signifies that the BRPs 
may not be extremely active during the night times and therefore, the production imbal-
ances are not paid attention as much as during the midday operations. This, in turn, results 
in the deviations between production plans and actual production. In addition, one eye-
catching case in the figure is the deviation peak taking place at 22:00. The reason for such 
a high average deviation might be the popularity of time-of-day electricity contracts in 
Finland. These contracts are based on day and nighttime division: Daytime is effective 
from 19:00 to 22:00, whereas nighttime is effective from 22:00 to 07:00 and has lower 
electricity unit charge (YLE 2016). Thus, the 22nd operating hour triggers higher electric-
ity demand especially on cold winter nights, since it is cheaper for the household con-
sumers to use electricity, for example, in order to heat up hot-water tanks. Such a sudden 
change in demand challenges production planning, which may possibly be the reason for 
high deviations between planned and actual production at 22:00. Overall, there is no un-
ambiguous answer to explain when and why the deviations are the highest, which weak-
ens the usability of production plans from the system imbalance prognosis point of view. 
As mentioned earlier, there is an evidence that the imbalance settlement model have re-
formed the behavior of the balance responsible parties: From the year 2009 when the 
model was introduced onwards, the deviations between production plans and actual pro-
duction have had a downward trend despite the increment in intermittent and weather-
dependent production. To support this finding, figure 26 below shows the number of 
hours with positive and negative deviations between 2009 and 2018. In the recent years, 
the dominant direction of the deviations has been positive and the trend lines show that 
the number of hours with negative deviations is decreasing while the number of hours 
with positive deviations is increasing. Such a phenomenon can be explained by the incen-
tives arising from the imbalance settlement model: Regardless of the imbalance pricing 
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mechanism, the most beneficial strategy for the BRPs in order to minimize their settled 
imbalance costs is to aspire after small intentional surplus (van der Veen et al. 2012). It 
seems that the Finnish balance responsible parties have learnt from the experience how 
to reduce imbalance costs and thus, it is reasonable that the number of hours with positive 
deviations has increased. This reinforces the notion that market mechanisms and market 
based signals guides the operations of the BRPs and there is a strong linkage between 
production planning and incentives. The system level imbalance prognosis should take 
into account the fact that the balance responsible parties are interested in taking long po-
sitions. 
 
 
Figure 26: Number of hours with positive (red) and negative (blue) deviations between production 
plans and actual production per year in Finland between 2009 and 2018. 
 
The findings above are central from the balancing philosophy point of view. TSOs that 
carry out proactive balancing rely on information that is available before the upcoming 
balancing period whereas reactive designs do not require that kind of extensive planning 
regarding the balancing. Production plans submitted by the balance responsible parties 
have been an essential part of the overview assessments that are made by the Nordic TSOs 
in order to prepare for the upcoming events. Such a procedure has been feasible due to 
the imbalance settlement model, which has motivated the BRPs not only to develop better 
production plans but also to behave according to the plans. This is demonstrated above 
by examining the key figures of the deviations between production plans and actual pro-
duction. The trend lines show that the deviations has become smaller on average between 
2009 and 2018, although the utilization of intermittent energy sources has increased sim-
ultaneously. From this point of view, it seems that the extensive planning could well re-
main as the core activity to determine the activation, direction and volume of the balanc-
ing products also in the future.  
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However, the upcoming market changes that are discussed more comprehensively in the 
previous chapters will bring plenty of uncertainty to the planning. First of all, the intro-
duction of the new imbalance settlement model, which consists of single balance and 
single price, will change the incentives that guide the behaviour of the BRPs. Earlier it 
has been profitable for the balance responsible parties to minimize the deviations between 
actual production and production plans that they have submitted to Fingrid, which has 
ensured that the production plans have represented the upcoming production in a well-
founded manner. The new model instead will give the BRPs more freedom to balance 
their positions not only with adjustable consumption but also with adjustable production. 
In addition, the model encourages the BRPs to take positions in to the right direction to 
support the system, which again can be done by adjusting production. Second, if the in-
traday market gate closure time is shortened close to zero permanently after the prospec-
tive pilot, it means that there will be electricity market trading taking place after the mo-
ment the balance responsible parties have sent the production plans to Fingrid. Thus, if 
Fingrid makes proactive decisions about the balancing several minutes before the start of 
an operating period based partly on the production plans, the outcome can be fundamen-
tally flawed. Along with these points there are a few proven faults related to the produc-
tion plans: When the state of production is changing, for example while the production is 
ramping up in the morning, the error margin of the production plans increase. Similarly, 
due to special occasions, such as day shifts, the deviations between production plans and 
actual production rise. All of these aspects question the relevance and usability of pro-
duction plans and, by implication, the proactive design. So far the market approaches has 
guaranteed that the production plans are binding and the TSOs have had enough leeway 
and sufficient information to generate extensive assessments, but the market development 
is heading towards an environment, where the BRPs have better tools and more freedom, 
not to mention more responsibility, related to the balance management. Thus, it is some-
what conflicting if Fingrid will continue to make proactive decisions based on plans that 
are more like estimates. The BRPs will always have the best knowledge concerning their 
own behaviour and assets, which can be harnessed for imbalance mitigation by providing 
proper incentives and operational environment for the balance responsible parties. Then, 
Fingrid could only take care of the stochastic real time imbalances by performing reactive 
actions. 
 
It is noteworthy that Fingrid uses production plans also for other purposes along with 
balance management. For example, the plans are a basis of electricity shortage forecasts 
and network condition predictions. Thus, the lack of decent information about production 
planning could threaten the system security. Producers and BRPs will most likely create 
production plans for their own use and for portfolio management despite the fact that the 
production plans will no longer be a part of the imbalance settlement in the future. This 
raises a question, if there is a need for an incentive to ensure that the BRPs are willing to 
submit reliable production plans to Fingrid in the future. For instance, such an incentive 
could penalize BRPs for deviations that are out of predefined limits. Another example is 
an incentive, which could penalize the BRPs that deviate from the production plans in the 
wrong direction, i.e. their deviations do not support the system. However, these incentive 
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models are inconsistent with the introduction of single balance and single price model: 
Why to implement market solutions that promote certain market-based behaviour, which 
is restricted by some other mechanism at the same time? One potential solution is that 
Fingrid starts to create a production prognosis that is not based on the production plans 
of the BRPs. Currently, the consumption forecast is based on former metered data and 
other variables, such as weather conditions and there is no input from the BRPs. Similarly, 
Fingrid could forecast production, which could also support the installation of weather-
dependent production: Probabilistic forecasting could possibly reduce the amount of re-
serve capacity that is needed to handle wind power forecast errors (Jung & Broadwater 
2014). Overall, production forecasting and the different alternatives require further re-
search. 
4.3 Availability of frequency restoration reserves 
Most often proactive balancing designs are associated with the utilization of manual fre-
quency restoration reserves, whereas reactive balancing designs generally relate to the 
usage of automatic frequency restoration reserves. In the Nordic synchronous system, it 
is recognized that the volume of aFRR is limited (ENTSO-E 2016). Thus, it is reasonable 
to analyze the availability prospects of the reserves as they have more or less influence 
on the balancing philosophy.  
 
Automatic frequency restoration reserve was introduced in the Nordic power system in 
2013 and Fingrid ensures its availability by maintaining a capacity market, which enables 
Fingrid to procure aFRR for certain morning and evening hours (Fingrid 2019i). Thus, 
the automatic frequency restoration reserve type is quite immature and its utilization is 
limited in the Nordics. However, the upcoming changes will significantly affect the cur-
rent situation. Firstly, as discussed in chapter 3, a new joint Nordic aFRR capacity market 
will be introduced along with an energy activation market. Secondly, the Nordic TSOs 
have agreed on an aFRR ramp-up plan, which aims to promote the aFRR availability and 
usage and make the aFRR procurement more cost efficient. The plan is based on two 
cornerstones: ramp-up of aFRR hours and capacity procurement volumes. They will be 
both increased gradually so that the aFRR can be utilized during all hours or quarters and 
the volumes will comply with the new dimensioning principles. (Affärverket Svenska 
kraftnät et al. 2018) These changes will provide the market participants with an indica-
tion, that the Nordic TSOs are increasingly interested in the utilization of automatic fre-
quency restoration reserves. In addition, the changes and the ramp-up plan will improve 
the maturity of the aFRR market gradually. Thus, according to these aspects it is reason-
able to assume that the availability of aFRR will increase in the future. 
 
The new specifications for the automatic frequency restoration reserve product will also 
increase the availability of the aFRR resources. The current specifications for the bids are 
quite demanding: As mentioned in chapter 2, the minimum size on an aFRR bid is 5 MW 
and the full activation time is 2 minutes. The upcoming changes related to the automatic 
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frequency restoration reserve markets will change the current situation dramatically. Sim-
ultaneously with the introduction of the new aFRR marketplaces, the specifications will 
be modified so that they will comply with the standard product specifications of the PI-
CASSO platform. The minimum bid size will decrease down to 1 MW and the full acti-
vation time will increase to 5 minutes as stated in chapter 3. The reduction in the bid size 
and the increment in the full activation time will improve the availability of the automatic 
frequency restoration reserve resources, which can be explained with a couple of factors. 
Firstly, the longer FAT will increase the number of bids submitted by the balance service 
providers and as a result, enhance the liquidity of the markets for aFRR capacity and 
energy (ENTSO-E 2018d). This has been proven in the Netherlands, where the transmis-
sion system operator TenneT NL developed a slower aFRR product with a longer full 
activation time. Consequently, the market liquidity increased, because more resources 
were able to participate in the market due to the lower requirement, and additionally, the 
prices of the bids decreased. (van Wanrooij et al. 2014) Secondly, the loosen requirement 
for the bid size will allow slower and smaller resources to participate in the aFRR market. 
The following example supports this claim: Electricity production units differ in terms of 
ramping rates. For instance, for some thermal units the maximum loading rate can be 
around 2 % of the maximum continuous rating per minute whereas the same number can 
be 100 % for hydro units (Kundur 1994). Thus, the power output change of certain pro-
duction resources is fairly limited. However, a thermal unit with the above ramping rate 
and a 10 MW output power can increase or decrease its production by 1 MW over 5 
minutes period and therefore, it can participate in the automatic frequency restoration 
reserve markets. With the current bid size limit of 5 MW, that same thermal unit is not 
able to offer its flexibility to the aFRR market.  
 
Compared to the automatic frequency restoration reserve, the manual FRR type is much 
more mature and its availability is better. There are a couple of reasons for that. First, as 
brought out in chapter 2, Fingrid maintains both capacity market and energy activation 
market for mFRR and the markets cover all hours of the day. Secondly, the current bal-
ancing philosophy exercised in the Nordics leans mainly on the utilization of manual fre-
quency restoration reserves and thus, the demand has created supply. Figure 27 below 
shows the activation percentage of available mFRR bids with up and down balancing 
direction. The percentages are calculated by comparing the sum of bids in the balancing 
energy market and the volume of ordered bids from the balancing energy market in Fin-
land in 2018. The data is retrieved from Fingrid’s open data website. The graphs show 
that the availability of mFRR bids including both balancing directions has been sufficient. 
For the up balancing direction, the highest activation percentage has been approximately 
70.2 % and for the down balancing direction, the same number has been approximately 
58.6 %. However, most of the time the activation percentages have been closer to zero. If 
all the hours with zero activation are left out, the average activation percentage for up 
balancing direction is approximately 6.4 % and the average activated volume is 53 MW. 
The same numbers for down balancing direction are 9.3 % and 52 MW, respectively.   
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Figure 27: The upper graph represents the activation percentage of available mFRR up balancing 
bids and the lower graph represents the activation percentage of available mFRR down balancing 
bids in Finland in 2018. 
 
The current availability of mFRR may change in the future because of the upcoming de-
velopment steps. The product specifications of manual frequency restoration reserve will 
undergo modifications due to the MARI platform, which defines the standard mFRR 
product characteristics. As described in chapters 2 and 3, the mFRR specifications will 
change in the following way: The minimum bid size will decrease from 5 MW to 1 MW 
and the full activation time will decrease from 15 minutes to 12.5 minutes. As discussed 
above, the full activation time affects the ability of the reserve resources to participate in 
the markets. In this situation, the decreasing FAT will rule slower resources out of the 
mFRR markets. However, the decreasing minimum bid size will allow smaller resources 
to participate in the markets. Thus, it is hard to conclude what the overall impact of the 
specification modifications on the availability of manual frequency restoration reserve is.  
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Along with these findings related to automatic and manual FRR, it is worth investigating 
if there exists a correlation between the day-ahead price and the availability of reserve 
resources. Since there is energy activation market only for the manual products, the anal-
ysis is based on the sum of mFRR bids in the balancing energy market and the day-ahead 
prices in 2018. The datasets are retrieved from Fingrid’s open data and Nord Pool’s mar-
ket data websites. Figure 28 below shows the correlation for both balancing directions.  
 
 
 
Figure 28: The upper graph represents the correlation between day-ahead price and sum of mFRR 
up balancing bids and the lower graph represent the correlation between day-ahead price and sum 
of mFRR down balancing bids in Finland in 2018. 
 
The above graphs and especially the trend lines show that there really exists a slight cor-
relation between the day-ahead prices and the availability of manual frequency restoration 
reserve bids. The r-squared value, which measures how well the regression trend line 
reflects the real data points, is 0.14 for the up balancing direction and 0.09 for the down 
balancing direction. Therefore, the correlation is stronger between the day-ahead prices 
and the up balancing bids than between the day-ahead prices and the down balancing bids. 
According to the analysis, the sum of mFRR bids with up balancing direction increases 
when the day-ahead price decreases and for the bids with down balancing direction, the 
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trend is the other way around. It is also interesting how the sum of bids behaves during 
price spikes. The sum of up balancing direction bids tends to be low during the day-ahead 
price spikes and the sum of down balancing direction bids tends to be high during the 
day-ahead price spikes. 
 
Based on the above speculation, it is reasonable to consider the outlook for the day-ahead 
prices in order to analyze the availability of reserve resources in the future. According to 
Spodniak et al. (2019), the overall price levels on electricity wholesale markets are de-
creasing in the Nordics because of the increasing share of production methods with low 
marginal costs, such as wind and solar power. In addition, the increment in the capacity 
of wind and solar power increases the electricity price volatility meaning that price spikes 
will take place more frequently. Considering these facts, it is impossible to conclude the 
overall influence of the day-ahead price on the availability of the reserve resources in the 
future. The decreasing price level will possibly increase the sum of up balancing bids and 
decrease the sum of down balancing bids in a slight manner. On the other hand, the in-
creasing number of price spikes will lower the sum of up balancing bids and boost the 
sum of down balancing bids. In addition, it is hard to say if these findings apply to aFRR 
energy activation bids, as there is no such data available. 
 
All in all, in the current situation it is safe to say that the availability of mFRR is superior 
to the availability of aFRR. Firstly, the current balancing philosophy relies strongly on 
the manual FRR type and the resulting demand has created sufficient supply. In addition, 
the marketplaces for mFRR are mature and cover all hours of the day. Taking into account 
these findings and the assumption that mFRR is typically a cornerstone of proactive de-
signs, Fingrid should definitely exercise proactive balancing also in the future. However, 
the outlook for the availability of aFRR is promising. The upcoming marketplaces will 
promote the availability of automatic frequency restoration reserve along with the relax-
ation of the bid requirements and specifications. In addition, it must be noted that the 
upcoming market solutions discussed in chapter 4.1 will theoretically reduce the demand 
for balancing product activations due to occurring imbalances are smaller and therefore, 
the availability of reserves will be less restrictive principle in the future. Based on these 
findings and the assumption that reactive designs rely mainly on aFRR, Fingrid can start 
moving towards a balancing design that is more reactive. In addition, mFRR bids can be 
activated reactively, if the activation type of the bid is direct activation. Thus, the mFRR 
bids can be utilized reactively to release already activated aFRR, which ensures the aFRR 
availability when new imbalances occur. 
4.4 Economic optimization 
Most often, the processes of different companies are carried out in a way that enable the 
companies to achieve high – or at least sufficient – quality at the lowest possible cost. 
This is called as the economic optimization of process design and it is a valid aspect to 
take into account when determining the balancing design of the Finnish power system. 
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Economic optimization related to balancing can be considered from both short-term and 
long-term point of view. 
 
Short-term economic optimization relate to the utilization of manual and automatic FRR 
products: There may appear price differences between the two, which could lead to 
changes in how the products are utilized in order to optimize direct balancing costs. Equa-
tion 4 below represents a total cost function of a TSO for the balancing product utilization 
taking into account energy payments. Capacity payments are sunk costs that cannot be 
recovered and thus, they are not involved in the equation. It should be noted that the 
payments related to down balancing reduce the total costs, because Fingrid charges the 
selected down-bidders for the energy according to the determined balancing energy price. 
On the other hand, up balancing increases the total costs as Fingrid compensates the se-
lected bidders for the energy according to the determined balancing energy price. 
 
 
                      𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐶𝑚𝐹𝑅𝑅−𝑢𝑝 − 𝐶𝑚𝐹𝑅𝑅−𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝐶𝑎𝐹𝑅𝑅−𝑢𝑝 − 𝐶𝑎𝐹𝑅𝑅−𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛                  (4) 
 
 
Where,  
 
 
CmFRR-up = Cost of mFRR up balancing 
CmFRR-down = Cost of mFRR down balancing 
CaFRR-up = Cost of aFRR up balancing  
CaFRR-down = Cost of aFRR down balancing 
 
Proactive balancing designs are based on the utilization of manual frequency restoration 
reserve type. From cost optimization perspective, the proactive balancing actions are 
profitable in situations, where the supposed costs related to the mFRR-based balancing 
are lower than the costs of reactive aFRR-based balancing. In the current situation and in 
the near future when the aFRR energy market is launched this may hold true, because the 
energy market for mFRR is mature and the availability of mFRR resources is better than 
that of aFRR. However, this kind of cost optimization as a whole is infeasible due to 
several reasons. First, the aFRR energy market will not quickly evolve further, if Fingrid 
promotes proactive design and the usage of manual FRR because of the lower prices. 
Secondly, if Fingrid aims to minimize its own costs related to the balancing, the outcome 
can be technically and economically inefficient due to the counter activation of balancing 
products (van Wanrooij et al. 2014). Along with these reasons, the proactive decision 
about the scheduled activation of mFRR needs to be made well before the actual operating 
period. Thus, the determination of the mFRR demand is based on the imbalance progno-
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sis, which includes inaccuracies as discussed earlier in this paper. Figure 29 below pre-
sents how the actual imbalance may differ from the imbalance prognosis, which reflects 
only the average imbalance over the period. This results in uncertainties, which truly 
challenge the proactive cost optimization, since there is no existing way to accurately 
forecast the balancing energy prices that are determined during the period of operation. 
 
 
Figure 29: Illustrative example of a hypothetical situation in which the imbalance prognosis (black 
line) differs from the actual imbalance (red line) during the balancing period. 
 
Long-term economic optimization is interested in the economic benefits that arise over 
longer period of time. As brought out in chapter 4.1.3, the amount of activated balancing 
energy and the procurement volumes of frequency restoration reserves in Germany have 
decreased after giving the balance responsible parties better tools and more responsibility 
related to the proactive balancing. The same findings can be observed in Belgium: Ac-
cording to van Wanrooij et al. (2014) the absolute imbalance volumes have decreased and 
the ACE quality has improved after the introduction of more reactive balancing design. 
These two are good examples of how the reactive designs entail plenty of benefits – also 
from the economic point of view. Decreased amount of activated balancing energy results 
in lower balancing costs and reduced volume of imbalances means lower imbalance costs 
for the BRPs.  
 
Overall, the economic optimization is a hard task including plenty of uncertainties. The 
proactive short-term optimization may lead to unfavorable situations whereas the long-
term optimization promotes designs that are more reactive at least according to a few 
European examples. Due to the findings, Fingrid should exercise reactive balancing de-
sign in the future in order to support long-term economic welfare. 
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5 Conclusions and discussion 
This thesis studies the balancing philosophy of the Finnish power system by evaluating 
proactive and reactive balancing design choices from several perspectives including mar-
ket solutions, usability of production plans, availability of frequency restoration reserves 
and economic optimization. The thesis shows that currently the Nordic TSOs focus on 
proactive balancing, which is based on different forecasts and expectations. The extensive 
planning determines the volume and direction of the manual frequency restoration reserve 
that is needed to be activated in advance of the period of operation. However, the Nordic 
power system balancing is undergoing major changes as the thesis has pointed out: The 
responsibility of each Nordic TSO related to the balancing of own control areas will in-
crease and the utilization of market-based solutions along with stronger price signals will 
improve. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to answer the questions: “What are the impli-
cations of the upcoming changes for the balancing design of the Finnish power system?”, 
“Should Fingrid promote proactive or reactive balancing design?” and “What are the 
reasons for the design choice and what are the aspects that require further research?” 
 
Based on the findings of the thesis, Fingrid should promote reactive balancing design, 
which is justified by the following arguments. First, the upcoming market solutions that 
are single price and single position imbalance settlement model, 15 minutes imbalance 
settlement period and intraday market development all imply that the balance responsible 
parties will have better tools closer to real time and stronger incentives to maintain their 
own balance in the future. The balance responsible parties are encouraged to be more 
active and more conscious about their imbalances and portfolio management as the mar-
kets and underlying profits enable new possibilities while the balancing cycle shortens. 
This means that the market participants will most likely take care of the proactive balanc-
ing and forecasted imbalances in a more efficient manner and therefore, proactive bal-
ancing carried out by Fingrid would possibly lead to counter activations and unwanted 
balancing performance due to technical and economic inefficiency. 
 
Second, Fingrid’s imbalance prognosis model, which will rest on the production plans of 
the balance responsible parties, will lose ground, because the market solutions do not 
direct the market participants to comply with the production plans to the best of their 
ability. So far, the absolute deviations between production plans and actual production 
have reduced, but the upcoming imbalance settlement model will ignore the production 
plans, which challenges their quality and correctness. Thus, the prognosis model can be 
unreliable and if the proactive decision-making concerning the balancing product utiliza-
tion is founded on it, the outcome can be flawed and the decisions can be false. In addi-
tion, the market participants have the best knowledge about their imbalances and portfo-
lio, and thus, by letting them to take care of the balancing close to real time, the overall 
result can be more accurate and efficient. 
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Third, according to the facts presented in this thesis, the need for frequency restoration 
reserve activations and procurement is likely to decline due to the reduction of the imbal-
ances in the system once reactive balancing design is introduced. When TSOs focus on 
reactive balancing, the balance responsible parties can make better use of their own flex-
ibility and the electricity markets closer to real time in order to balance themselves and 
support the system with imbalance mitigation. This is likely to improve the efficient uti-
lization of assets and decrease the costs related to the balancing, which results in overall 
economic welfare.  
 
Fourth, the assertion that the Nordic TSOs need to rely on the utilization of mFRR due to 
the limited availability of aFRR in the Nordics is inadequately justified. If Fingrid starts 
to promote the reactive balancing design, which is founded on the utilization of the auto-
matic frequency restoration reserves, the increasing demand will signify that the TSO is 
willing to take advantage of the available aFRR resources, which in turn will presumably 
create supply. In addition, the specifications of the aFRR bids will loosen, which is likely 
to improve the aFRR availability at least in theory. Along with these viewpoints, if the 
activation volumes decrease due to exercising reactive design, the availability is not that 
central restriction in the future. 
 
It is evident that Fingrid should promote reactive design, since the benefits are consider-
able. To fully harness the potential of reactive balancing, this thesis recommends that 
Fingrid should start to publish balancing volumes, directions and prices as close to real 
time as possible. This would support the balance responsible parties with balancing. In 
addition, the intraday market development is very central and thus, the gate closure time 
of 0 minutes should be implemented on a permanent basis after the pilot. Along with the 
gate closure time, this thesis recommends that the intraday auctions are put into operation 
or at least investigated more precisely. 
 
After all, the exact behavior of the balance responsible parties and the real consequences 
of the upcoming changes are hard to foresee. In addition, there are so many changes pro-
ceeding simultaneously and rapidly, which makes it impossible to take into account all 
the details and to anticipate all the possible outcomes. There are no available data regard-
ing the markets and imbalances of the future and thus, this thesis has leant on the existing 
data and several assumptions meaning that the findings are based on the best current 
knowledge. In addition, a few aspects require further research. First, congestion manage-
ment and network conditions have not gained much attention in this paper. It can be pos-
sible that the reactive balancing actions are not sufficient to handle power grid conges-
tions, which is why there may exist a need for proactive TSO balancing in order to take 
care of the bottlenecks. Thus, the congestion management point of view should be dis-
cussed thoroughly. Related to this point of view, it should be also investigated further 
how Fingrid could secure the reliability and accuracy of production forecasting in the 
future. 
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Figure 3. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2011. 
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Figure 4. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2012. 
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Figure 5. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2013. 
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Figure 6. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2014. 
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Figure 7. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2015. 
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Figure 8. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2016. 
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Figure 9. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2017. 
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Figure 10. / Appendix 1. Deviations between planned production and actual production in MW in 
Finland in 2018. 
 
